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The most revolutionary power of the Internet lies in the way it changes people’s 
collaborative work, aggregating social knowledge at an ever-increasing speed. This trend 
has been manifested in a variety of social information sharing and augmenting systems, 
such as Wikipedia, Question-and-Answer (Q&A) forums, and crowdsourcing websites. 
Understanding the information and social dynamics involved in these systems is crucial 
to improve their design and truly harness their power. This dissertation is devoted to 
investigating how two important factors, incentive and culture, significantly and 
interactively shaped users’ information and social behavior in the information-sharing 
websites I studied.   
This dissertation is organized by four interlinked studies, which address incentive design 
in online information sharing systems from four perspectives: how users learn and adapt 
their behavior to an incentive design dynamically; how users’ adaptation dynamics 
contribute to a positive feedback mechanism that sustains the community; how culture 
deeply influences information and social dynamics, even given with very similar virtual 
point incentive designs and system platforms; and how incentive design can interact with 
a particular community structure and cultural context in a very comprehensive and 
complex way, and how the interaction can lead to a co-evolution process between the 






One of the most revolutionary potentials of the Internet is how it changes people’s 
collaborative work. And nowhere is this more obvious than in sites that collect 
intellectual contributions from otherwise disparate and distributed peer users on a 
massive scale. This trend has manifested itself in various familiar examples such as open 
source projects, Wikipedia, Question-and-Answer (Q&A) forums, and social tagging sites 
such as Flickr and Del.icio.us. These collaborative sites are designed to support a variety 
of knowledge augmentation processes. For example, Wikipedia is building a massive 
encyclopedia by accumulating knowledge contributions from distributed peer experts. 
Question-and-Answer (Q&A) forums provide platforms for people to exchange 
information and knowledge on an ongoing basis. A more recent type of collaborative 
service is called “crowd-sourcing,” in which intellectual tasks are directly outsourced to 
individual workers through public solicitation (Howe, 2006, 2008; Kleeman et al., 2008). 
Crowdsourcing sites have been growing fast in number, popularity, and research 
attention. For example, one of the earliest sites that have been studied, Taskcn.com, is 
using a competition mechanism to outsource diverse types of tasks, such as designing a 
company logo or translating a research statement. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is 
similarly designed to collect human labor to accomplish “human intelligence tasks” (HITs) 
requested by users, who pay workers a small fee (Mason & Watts, 2009).  
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More so than regular webpages, collaborative sites can easily flop and fail. Even a site by 
one of the Internet’s most visible companies, Google Answers failed and exists no longer. 
Butler found that almost half of many social, hobby, and work mailing lists become silent 
after about 122 days (Butler, 2001). And among those still active, traffic was very low, 
with a median of one message every 3.6 days (Cummings et al., 2002). To stay alive, 
collaborative sites need to maintain a reasonable group size and enough participation 
over time. But that can be more challenging  in online communities, where people have 
few strong ties and less commitment to the group than they do in offline settings. Even 
active online communities suffer from sparse participation. For example MovieLens 
(http://www.movielens.org), an online movie recommendation site, more than 22% of 
the movies on the site obtained fewer than 40 ratings. This defeats the purpose of the 
site, since it doesn’t have enough data to make personalized recommendations and 
predictions (Chen, Harper, et al., 2010).  
A wealth of literature has tried to understand what it takes to motivate people to join 
online groups or participate more (Joyce & Kraut, 2006). Empirical studies have 
suggested that there are both extrinsic reasons (such as gaining reputation, education, 
and money (Hertel et al., 2003; Lakhani & Hippel, 2003)) and intrinsic reasons (like the 
inherent pleasure of problem solving, altruism, and commitment to a community 
(Holohan & Garg, 2005; Rossi, 2004)). These people share similar motivations when 
participating in online Question-and-Answer (Q&A) communities. For example, on 
Korea’s largest Q&A forum Naver, interviewees frequently report altruism, learning, and 
business motives as reasons for answering others’ questions (Nam et al., 2009).  
More often, sites build in incentive mechanisms to motivate people’s participation. For 
example, Taskcn and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk both allow requesters to pay 
contributors. Community-based Q&A forums, such as Yahoo!Answers (Adamic et al., 
2008), Baidu Knows (Yang et al., 2010), and the now defunct Google Answers (Chen et al., 
2010) have used incentive schemes ranging from flat-rate virtual currency in Yahoo! 
Answers, flexible-rate virtual currency in Baidu Knows and Naver Knowledge-In (Nam et 
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al., 2009), to real-market schemes (in Google Answers). But incentives do not have to be 
money or points. For example, Chen et al. (2010) did a field experiment with Movielens 
and found that a social comparison design can also motivate people to contribute.  
As one of the primary questions concerning both researchers and designers, whether 
and how these incentives can motivate more and better contributions has been the 
major question to assess these systems. For example, field experiments conducted on a 
series of Q&A sites have indicated that higher awards can induce more answers but 
yielded mixed results in quality of answers (Chen et al., 2010; Harper et al., 2008). In 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, researchers found the consistent result that money increased 
the quantity of contributions, but not the quality (Mason & Watts, 2009). Field studies 
with Baidu Knows (Yang & Wei, 2009) and Naver Knowledge-In (Nam et al., 2009) also 
found that incentives increased the amount of answers. 
Incentive systems are so prevalent in collaboration sites that it is almost shocking how 
little research has been done to understand and evaluate these systems. Most studies 
that have done so are limited because they measure “one-time” transactions: whether an 
individual award can bring more payoffs and payoffs of higher quality (answers on a 
Q&A site, for example). But system designers want to know about users’ responses to an 
incentive design in a dynamic perspective, and how to encourage and sustain 
participation over time. For example, it is important to know whether users learn to 
adapt to the incentive design, whether the adaptation provides positive or negative 
feedback to the system, and which design features will encourage continuing 
participation.  
People’s learning and adaptive behaviors have often been observed in lab experiments, 
but very few studies have documented how learning works online. A study on eBay 
found that users learn over time to snipe, or submit their bids close to the end of the 
bidding period (Wilcox, 2000). In addition, experienced users are less likely to make 
multiple bids on the same item (for example increasing their limit once they see that they 
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have been outbid). This is especially true for items that are easy to place an objective 
dollar value on, as opposed to items that are more based on personal preference. 
Joyce and Kraut (2006) first investigated how online newsgroups sustain newcomers, 
who often face obstacles in their peripheral participation (Wenger, 1998). Across six 
different online news groups, the results showed that people’s initial interaction 
experience (got-reply) can predict whether newcomers continue participating, while 
characteristics of initial posts are related to the characteristics of the replies they 
obtained. A similar study (Arguello et al., 2006) found that the chance of getting a reply 
varies across different topic groups, and that newcomers and old timers differ in their 
ability to get replies. This implies that sustainability depends on the particular system 
and the culture of its users. Lampe and Johnston (2005) explored another kind of online 
forum, Slashdot, which has a different conversation format and moderation rules. This 
study also found that newcomers’ first interactions with the system (group) were 
important and that feedback from the system (moderation) is related to the time to post 
and score of the second post.  
These studies all show that initial interactions are crucial to sustain new users, but these  
initial interaction dynamics vary across different users, domains, and systems,  calling for 
more systematic and controlled investigations. In addition, these studies have all looked 
at the initial stage of participation—whether someone returns after their first visit. This is 
not sufficient to describe the variety in individuals’ length of stay, level of involvement, 
and ways of participating. Moreover, systems evolve over time, so how user participation 
changes depending on whether the system is new or well established. 
Arguello et al. (2006) found that interaction dynamics can be very different across online 
groups. But the interaction between incentive design and national culture has the 
potential to be much more unpredictable. The 400-million-strong Chinese market is a 
great example of this. When information systems have simply taken their product more 
or less “as is” into China, (e.g., eBay, Orkut, and Yahoo!), they have encountered serious 
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challenges. To overcome these challenges and design better systems, we need to 
understand different cultures. 
Cross-cultural psychologists and sociologists have found that Westerners and East Asians 
have fundamental differences not just in the content of their beliefs and ideas, but in the 
basic way they view things and process information. Psychologists have called the 
Western pattern “analytic,” and the East Asian pattern “holistic” (Nisbett et al., 2001). 
Across dozens of experiments, psychologists have shown that Westerners tend to focus 
more of their attention on central items rather than the context; they are more narrowly 
focused; they see items as individuals, rather than as bound up in a situation or in 
relationships with others; and they tend to use formal logic or rules of non-contradiction. 
East Asian thought is called “holistic” because they pay more attention to the entire 
visual field, including the background and the context; they see human behavior as tied 
up with that context; and they think more intuitively and dialectically, finding meaning 
and value in contradiction (Nisbett et al., 2001; Varnum et al., 2010). Some psychologists 
have argued that this difference can be traced back to these cultures’ social orientation: 
individualism and collectivism (Varnum et al., 2010). Western cultures value 
independence, individualism, autonomy, and self-achievement (Hofstede, 1980); in 
contrast, Asian cultures emphasize interdependence, harmony, relatedness, and 
connection (Hofstede, 1983; Singelis, 1994; Triandis, 1995). These differences interact 
with and shape deeply cultural things, such as value systems (Aristotelian vs. Confucian 
intellectual traditions)(Lloyd, 1996; Pye, 1985), languages (Varnum et al., 2010), religions 
(Dollinger, 1988), economic ideology (Ralston et al., 2007), and industrialization and 
geographic mobility (Kitayama et al., 2009). 
These inherent cultural characteristics can significantly affect how people perceive and 
use a system/design, and how they interact with others in collaborative sites. In fact, I 
found that cultural factors predict people’s perception, preferences, and motivations in 
their social Q&A behavior more than other demographic variables (Yang et al., 2011), 
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which suggests that cultural differences are an important variable to understand to 
design across groups and contexts. 
Fortunately, there is a rapidly growing stock of research on cultural issues in HCI and 
CSCW (Setlock & Fussell, 2010). These studies have focused mainly on the adoption and 
usage of collaboration tools. For example, Asian users have been found to prefer multi-
party chat, audio-video chat, and emoticons in IM (Kayan et al., 2006), benefit more from 
rich communication media in negotiation (Veinott et al., 1999), and be less satisfied with 
asynchronous communication (Massey et al., 2001). Setlock and Fussell (2010) found that 
Asian participants involve additional considerations when deciding on appropriate 
communication tools, especially the ability to support social processes. 
But because incentive design is so complex—and because studying it across cultures is 
so difficult—empirical studies are rare. However, understanding this is crucial in 
designing cross-cultural collaborative systems. Simply put, more in-depth studies on the 
interaction between incentive and culture are therefore motivated. 
Around this general theme, I conducted four interlinked studies of incentive design in 
online knowledge sharing systems. Each study takes a different perspective: (1) How 
users learn and adapt their behavior in response to incentives in Witkey websites. Witkey 
websites are an emerging knowledge market design in which an all-pay auction model is 
used to crowd-source peer expertise. (2) How adaption dynamics contribute to a positive 
feedback mechanism that sustains community in a Q&A site, Baidu Knows. (3) How 
information and social dynamics differ across different cultural contexts, even given with 
very similar virtual point incentive designs and system platforms. (4) How incentive 
design can interact with a specific cultural context. 
In the first study (Chapter 2, published as Yang et al., 2008 b), I examined the behavior of 
users on one of the biggest Witkey websites in China, Taskcn. On Taskcn, people post 
diverse types of tasks (e.g., designing a company logo or translating a research 
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statement) with a monetary reward for the reward to the person who has their solution 
selected. I found that users were learning and adopt strategies over time. Users tended 
to select tasks where they were competing against fewer opponents to increase their 
chances of winning. They also selected tasks with higher expected reward; these tended 
to be tasks that require a high skill level, but low work-load. There was a small portion of 
users who had won multiple times and were able to practice the strategies better than 
others, discovering less competitive tasks and submitting solutions in a later stage. 
Despite that, overall, users do not increase their chance of winning. But this small core of 
winners (0.12% of all submitters) managed to increase their win-to-submit ratio over 
time. Moreover, since most users quit after only a few submissions, this core group 
proposes nearly 20% of the winning solutions on the site and actually sustains the site 
behind the high traffic of casual participants. This study revealed patterns of how design 
causes users to develop strategies over time and how user groups with vastly different 
patterns of behavior all contribute to a site’s dynamic.  
The second study (Chapter 3, published as Yang & Wei, 2009) investigates user behavior 
in a large-scale knowledge sharing community, Baidu Knows.  Askers and answerers on 
Baidu Knows had evolving behavior patterns that sustained the community. In particular, 
there is a positive feedback cycle: you put in effort, you win, you are rewarded, and you 
participate more. There is also a core of generalized reciprocity. A large fraction of users 
are tied through indirect helping relationships, including askers and answerers. In 
addition, the core group of users who both ask and answer are motivated by the virtual 
point system and make the majority of contribution to the site. As such, the system has 
been able to successfully exchange knowledge among distributed experts.  
To further assess incentive design in a broader context, I conducted the third study 
(Chapter 4), a comprehensive analysis of users’ activity lifespan and participation pattern 
across three predominant online knowledge-sharing communities: Yahoo!Answers, Baidu 
Knows, and Naver Knowledge-IN in English, Chinese, and Korean, respectively (originally 
published as Yang et al., 2010). These three community-based Question-Answering 
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(Q&A) sites share very similar virtual point incentive and system design, and are 
comparable in their history and scale. Extending previous work focusing on initial 
interactions of new users, I used survival analysis to quantify participation patterns that 
can be used to predict individual lifespan over the long term. Across all three sites, users 
who prefer answering tend to stay longer and they are also sensitive to the initial 
experience on the site. In addition, users’ first-month experience can account for a 
considerable amount of variance of predicted lifespan. In particular, users’ self-selection 
effect (whether a user is active or what type of role he/she likes to play) and performance 
in the community account for the most variance in the prediction. Despite these 
similarities, there were very intriguing differences between the sites: answerers tend to 
be more active in providing answers in Yahoo! Answers than the other two sites, and the 
question-answering dynamics on Yahoo!Answers tend to be more conversational than 
Baidu Knows. This might be explained by a complex interaction between the incentive 
design and cultural contexts. Furthermore, a longitudinal comparison of the 
communities’ evolution between two distinct stages suggests that users’ commitment or 
a site’s ability to sustain users can evolve over the different life stages of a system. 
Because the interaction between incentive design and culture is so complex, the fourth 
study (Chapter 5) provides an in-depth picture of the social motivations and dynamics of 
Mitbbs.com (published as Yang, Ackerman, and Adamic, 2011). Mitbbs is a thriving 
Chinese online forum for Chinese people located overseas to share information and 
sustain their virtual bond of common identity. Based on over 4 years of observation and 
data collection, this study shows how a virtual currency system—not unlike those used 
by many American websites—has evolved into an essential medium for extremely 
diverse and culturally specific social exchange activities. The social interactions reflect the 
traditional Chinese idea of guanxi, or interpersonal influence and connectedness, while at 
the same time incorporating the norms of a new generation of Internet users. This study 
demonstrates how incentive design can interact with a particular culture and how that 
pushes along how users perceive and use the incentive design.  
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These four studies take four different angles to the question of how people’s behavior on 
online information sharing systems is shaped by incentive design and culture. They 
together provide the first comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the dynamic 
perspective of these systems: users learn and adapt to incentive designs; this process 
interacts with their particular cultural characteristics and context; and the way users 
perceive and use these systems evolve over time. These four studies approach this 
problem with quantitative measures, comparative study, statistical modeling, and field 
ethnographic investigation. After explaining the studies, Chapter 5 will address the 





Learning and Strategic Behavior in a 
Crowdsourcing Site 
Crowdsourcing, or the use of an Internet-scale community to outsource a task, has 
garnered considerable interest in the popular press. Articles in Wired (Howe, 2006) and 
Business Week (Hempel, 2006), for example, repeat the same success stories for video, 
stock photography, and even corporate R&D. However, the media coverage consists 
primarily of anecdotal evidence in an often relentlessly enthusiastic manner. Empirically-
based analytical studies of crowd sourcing sites are, unfortunately, lacking.   
This chapter presents one such study.  It analyzes use of a Witkey site, Taskcn.com, where 
users offer monetary awards for solutions to problems. Other users provide solutions in 
the hopes of winning the awards. Taskcn has 1.7 million registered users. Users have 
requested solutions for nearly 3,100 tasks, and 543,000 solutions have been proposed all 
in less than two years. 
It might appear that the site should be drowning in newbies and lurkers; yet, the site 
appears to be quite successful. Askers clearly get solutions. More interestingly, the site 
appears to be socially stable,  there is a core of users who repeatedly propose and win.  
The large numbers of new users ensure many answers, while also providing new 
members for the stable core. The data from this study will show that crowdsourcing 
works, albeit perhaps only as long as it is a popular phenomenon. 
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In this chapter I focus on three important aspects of this expertise-sharing marketplace. 
The first is whether tasks are priced according to the expertise and effort level required. 
The second is the set of factors involved in strategic selection, and whether users learn to 
better their chances of winning over time. The third is what distinguishes the successful 
users from the unsuccessful users over time. All of these are important to maintain the 
site as an ongoing and successful marketplace. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: First we introduce the literature background on 
knowledge market, and Witkeys and Taskcn in particular. We then talk about our data 
collection. This is followed by a discussion of our findings about pricing, strategic 
selection, and winners. We conclude with design implications and future work. 
1. Literature Background 
Knowledge Market 
A variety of collaborative sites have been designed to collect intellectual contributions 
from distributed peer users of large scale. These sites accumulate many types of 
knowledge, ranging from the pieces of information or knowledge exchanged in 
Question-and-Answer (Q&A) sites, aggregated meta knowledge about information items 
such as social tags on Flickr and Del.icio.us and recommendations on Netflix, to 
structured knowledge repositories like Wikipedia. “Crowd-sourcing” sites collect another 
type of knowledge in which well-defined tasks are outsourced to individual workers 
through public solicitation (Howe, 2006, 2008; Kleeman et al., 2008). Crowdsourcing sites 
have been growing fast in number, popularity, and research attention. For example, one 
of the earliest sites that have been studied, Taskcn.com, is using a competition 
mechanism to outsource diverse types of tasks, such as designing a company logo or 
translating a research statement. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is similarly designed 
to collect human labor to accomplish “human intelligence tasks” (HITs) requested by 
users, who pay workers  a small fee (Mason & Watts, 2009). 
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Unlike Wikipedia or Flickr, crowdsourcing sites are task-driven with arbitrary 
requirements (or expectations) for completion time, quality, and other features. These  
more defined “tasks” tend to fall outside of the intrinsic motivation or some form of 
social reward (Nov et al., 2008), compared to those free-structured and non-defined 
contribution tasks. Therefore, financial incentives have been increasingly involved in 
designing crowdsourcing services. For example, Taskcn and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
both allow requesters to pay contributors. Q&A forums offer virtual currencies and even 
real money. 
Economists and sociologists are interested in understanding how incentives can be used 
to motivate contributions to these systems, and several past studies have focused on this 
question. For example, field experiments conducted on a series of Q&A sites have found 
that higher awards induce more answers, but yielded mixed results in quality of answers 
(Chen et al., 2010; Harper et al., 2008). A study on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk found that 
money consistently increased the quantity of contribution, but not the quality (Mason & 
Watts, 2009). Field studies on Baidu Knows (Yang & Wei, 2009) and Naver Knowledge-In 
(Nam et al., 2009) found that virtual points can also motivate more of answer 
contributions.  
These studies, however, are limited to evaluating “one-time” transactions. It is also 
important to know how users dynamically respond to incentive design and how online 
systems evolve over time.  
User Behavior in Knowledge Market 
A number of studies have looked into how people participate in online knowledge 
markets. Hiltz and Turoff (1993) first found that the distribution of contribution is 
extremely skewed. A few people contribute a lot, while everyone else only contributes a 
little. This has been found in a large number of  computer-mediated communication 
(CMC) systems and online settings, for example, in Wikipedia (Kittur et al., 2007) and 
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online social media such as Del.icio.us (Golder & Huberman, 2006) and FlickR (Marlow et 
al., 2006). In Wikipedia, a small subset of authors make a larger fraction of the edits, but 
their edits have greater longevity  (Adler & Alfaro, 2007). In contrast, users who casually 
contribute content have a higher rate of bad edits that are quickly reversed. Despite 
these problems, quality remains high. For example, Wikipedia has been shown to be 
close in accuracy to Encyclopedia Britannica (Giles, 2005). Interestingly, that may change 
in the future because of a recent trend whereby Wikipedia and Del.icio.us are seeing 
more and more contributions from non-elite users (Kittur et al., 2007).  
Other recent work has examined the dynamics of knowledge-sharing systems, such as 
technical forums and community-based question-answering sites. For example, a study 
investigating Java Forum hosted by Sun found that the most active users also tend to be 
the most expert, and they are likely to answer both newbie questions and technical 
questions (Zhang et al., 2007). Another study found very diverse knowledge and 
expertise sharing on Yahoo!Answers, where many questions are prompts for discussion 
or support, rather than pure information-seeking (Adamic et al., 2008). In addition, in 
top-level categories, such as science and math, where most questions are of a factual 
nature, specializing within a subcategory correlates with a higher proportion of “winning” 
answers. 
But real-world studies of crowdsourcing sites are few and far between. Most studies of 
strategic and learning behaviors have been carried out in the lab. Even among the few 
real-world studies, most studies have been restricted to online auctions. Researchers 
have found that eBay users learn over time to snipe, or submit their bids close to the end 
of the bidding period (Wilcox, 2000). Although the timing of the bid should not matter if 
all players are rational and submit their true valuation, early bidding can prompt 
irrational bidders to up their bid. It is therefore advantageous to submit one’s bid later, 
and indeed, 13% of the bids on eBay occur in the last 5 minutes of the auction. Wilcox 
(2000) also found that more experienced users are less likely to submit multiple bids on 
the same item, especially for items with a large common value component. 
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2. Taskcn as A Knowledge Market  
A Witkey website is a new type of knowledge market website, in which users offer  
monetary awards for a question or task, and other users provide solutions to compete 
for the award. The website plays the role of the trusted third party by collecting the 
money from the requester and distributing the award to the winner(s), whom the 
requester chooses. The website takes a small portion of the award as a service fee. 
The term "Witkey" was coined by the founder of the website Witkey.com1 in 2005, and it 
became the name of a series of similar websites in China. This business pattern has 
quickly motivated a number of followers: in the last two years, more than 10 Witkey 
websites have been launched (e.g., Witkey.com, Taskcn.com, zhubajie.com, and k68.cn). 
Within a relatively short time, the Witkey model has demonstrated its capability to 
gather people to share knowledge. Taskcn is one of the biggest Witkey websites in 
China, and we analyze it here. It had 1,691,404 users registered between June 2006 and 
December 2007. "Witkey" is a very popular phenomenon in China, and there are many 
more sites in addition to Taskcn and Witkey.com. For example, on k68.com, 936,462 
users participated in at least one task from July 2004 to January 2008;2 and zhubajie.com 
claims to have added 497,169 users from its launch date of December 2005 to January 
2008.3 
Witkey websites can be seen as harbingers of the freelance markets that were forecast in 
Malone’s “The Future of Work” (Malone, 2004). Witkeys differ from open question 
answer forums such as Yahoo! Answers, because instead of questions that are answered 
by other users without payment, the requesters offer awards for completion of tasks they 







requesters to offer rewards for answered questions, limited the participation of those 
competing to answer to a few (<500) vetted individuals. In contrast, Witkeys seem to 
foster a new and completely open way to share more complex knowledge among 
individuals of distributed expertise (Yang et al., 2008 a). On Witkey websites, tasks usually 
require particular expertise and include a moderate investment of effort on behalf of the 
task-solvers. For example, many companies are looking for logo designs, a task that 
requires solution providers to have particular design expertise. In addition, to complete 
the tasks the solution providers need to take efforts to learn about the companies. The 
mechanism provides an incentive: the potential monetary award that encourages 
people’s participation.  
Because users submit their work directly, and concurrently with other users competing 
on the same task, they have little guarantee that their work will receive a monetary 
reward. This is different from Google Answers, which recruited a small number of expert 
answerers. Google Answers' answerers would select tasks to complete, and would have 
an exclusive lock on the task for a period of time. Witkeys also differ from sites such as 
eLance and TopCoder, where requesters pose a task and anyone can submit their 
credentials and proposals, but the task is not attempted until after the requester chooses 
a person or team to complete it.    
Witkeys therefore occupy an interesting position in the design space of online 
knowledge -sharing sites. The tasks must necessarily be of relatively low complexity and 
effort, since a user has no guarantee of collecting the award before submitting their 
solution. However, this also poses a distinct advantage to the requester, as they are able 
to choose among several possible solutions to their task. The financial component also 
encourages users to contribute expertise beyond simple question answering, as might 
occur on no-fee sites such as Yahoo! Answers. For instance, some tasks ask for 
professionals to develop websites: there are relatively fewer individuals who have this 
particular expertise than there are people who would be able to answer a typical 
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there are only 5953 (3.2%) who have ever won. Yet, for all the completed tasks, each task 
has an average of 184 competitors, with each user being able to submit only once. Note, 
however, the distribution of submissions is heavily skewed as shown Figure 2. This 
variable, namely the number of competitors in a task, is the single strongest factor 
determining a user’s probability of winning, exceeding even the individual's past winning 
record (Yang et al., 2008 a). This result in particular suggests that intentionally choosing 
less popular tasks to participate could potentially enhance winning probabilities, even if 
one’s own expertise remains the same.  In section 4 of the paper, we will see that, as they 
gain experience, users in fact do choose less crowded tasks.  
3. Data Set and Approaches 
The data include all 3112 tasks that were completed (i.e., the task is closed and winner is 
decided) from June 2006 (Taskcn's launch date) to December 2007. A task has these 
basic variables: 
Table 1: Variables of tasks on Taskcn 
Variable Name Description 
Task Start-Time When a task is posted and competition starts 
Task End-Time The deadline for submission 
Task Period The period between Start-time and End-time, counted by day 
Task Type The type the task has been categorized into 
Task Award The amount of monetary award the task offers 
# of Registrations The number of users who registered to participate in the task 
# of Submissions The number of users who submitted solutions for the task 
# of Winners Some tasks can have more than one winner, this variable is 
obtained by the actual result of the competition 
We also collected activity data on all users who had participated at least once in these 
tasks and excluded those who had registered on the website but had never contributed. 
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This yielded a total of 185,429 users with data on the number of submissions made 
(excluding tasks for which they registered but did not submit a solution), the number of 
wins, and initial date they registered on the website. Although Taskcn.com requires users 
to provide their real names, we excluded all identifiable information in this study. We 
also collected data on the interaction between a user and a task, such as the time of 
submission and whether or not the user won in the task. 
Basic Participation Pattern 
To understand the expertise sharing on Taskcn, it is important to understand the 
strategies users employ in task selection, since users can choose the tasks they want to 
compete.  All ongoing tasks are listed in many ways such that users can browse: e.g., by 
categories or by award range; and all tasks are listed by recency. In addition, when one is 
exploring a particular task page, there are several similar tasks listed aside: for example, 
next to a task requesting a company logo design, there will be several other recent logo 
design tasks listed. 
First, we look at how users behave in participating in a task. Users can view a task, place a 
task in their profiles, register to participate in the task, and submit a solution to the task.  
A higher monetary award will result in significantly more views of the task page. After log 
transforming the variables (due to the skew in distribution of both award amount and 
number of views), we find a high positive correlation (= 0.64, sig. <10-4). Users will also 
be more likely to register for the task upon viewing it if the award is higher (= 0.60, sig. 
<10-3), but there is a lower correlation with the number of solutions submitted (= 0.43, 
sig. <10-4). If we consider the difference between the number of registrants and final 
submissions as an indicator of how often people gave up on their submission, we find 
that higher money award is correlated with a higher percentage of users who give up 
(= 0.37, sig. <10-4). This result suggests that monetary award can draw users’ attention 
and even intent; however, there are other factors that affect the final number of 
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submissions and quality. One possible explanation is in the result from the following 
section, where we found that higher award tasks tend to require a higher skill level. Users 
may initially register for the task but give up once they find their skills inadequate. 
Tasks, Effort, and Award 
In addition to the award offered by each task, it is important to understand the 
relationship between other task properties and users’ participation, particularly with 
regard to the effects of pricing. To do this, we employed human-coding to rate the 
implicit properties of tasks. We used two raters (professional designers) to evaluate 157 
randomly selected tasks in the design category (10% of the total tasks in the category) in 
terms of following task dimensions: 
Table 2: Human-coded variables for design tasks 
Dimension Definition Inter-rater reliability 
Skill 
requirement 
The lowest professional skill 
required for completing the task 
Spearman's rho = 0.38** 
Workload The time an average person of  
the required skill level will take 
to complete the task 
Spearman's rho = 0.40** 
The raters evaluated the tasks without knowing the amount of reward that had been 
offered, so did not obtain cues as to the value of the task from the price. For this sample 
of tasks, the inter-rater reliability is relatively low. However, note that we are then using 
these scores (the average of the ratings given by the two raters) to correlate e.g. the skill 
level required to the amount of the reward. The low inter-rater reliability would only 
introduce noise that would make the correlation with any other variable lower than it 
potentially is. We therefore report these correlations with the understanding that the 
effect we are observing is at least of this strength. So for example, we may be 
underestimating the degree to which skill level correlates with the amount of reward 
offered, but we are not overestimating it.  
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There are interesting correlations among the task properties. Task award is a positive 
indicator of the skill requirement, which means that users tend to offer more money on 
tasks of higher skill requirement. A combination of interest in both money and design 
can make those tasks more desirable. 
Table 3: Spearman’s correlations of task variables 
 Award Skill-Required 
Skill-Required 0.493**  
Workload -0.443** -0.629** 
Interestingly, award and skill-required are negatively correlated with workload. Although 
at first one may expect that tasks that require more effort in terms of time should be 
compensated appropriately, note that the raters were instructed to rate the amount of 
time it would take a person of an appropriate skill level to complete the task. Even so, it is 
interesting that workload should be negatively correlated with reward. Anecdotally, users 
who post a high-quality task and offer more money often just ask for a concise solution. 
For example, one task offered 2000 yuan for a logo design for a conference organized by 
a famous magazine. On the other hand, there are also many cases in which tasks 
requiring a great deal of work come with a tiny money award.  
Table 4: Spearman’s correlation between task 
properties and number of submissions to the task 
 Award Skill-Required Workload 
Submission # 0.211 0.253** -0.242** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
We also find that these task property variables influence participation: Table 4 shows that 
award and required skill level attract users, while people avoid the tasks that have larger 
workload or don’t offer sufficient award. We will show in Section 4 that these task 
properties also have different effects on participation for experienced users. 
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4. Users’ Continuing, Learning, and Adaptation 
Winning as Incentive to Continue 
As we see that the properties of the tasks and the award offered by the tasks can 
influence people’s decision on whether to participate in a competition, we further 
examine what makes them continue. Merely winning appears to play an important role in 
contribution. The vast majority of the users on the Witkey websites actually get nothing 
from their contributions, since the probability of winning is so small. One might therefore 
expect that a lot of users would leave after a couple of failures. In fact, from 2006 June to 
May 2007, there were 66,182 users who had one, two, or three submissions during this 
period and never submitted anything else after May 2007. These users, one third of 
Taskcn's total participants, disappeared. The high number of registered users who have 
never attempted a task (89%) suggests that although there are many people interested 
in participating, they might be hindered by the very likely futility of their efforts.  
For those who do elect to participate, the first attempt in the competition can be very 
important in influencing their subsequent participation in Taskcn. There are 2307 users 
who won on the first attempt and 169,456 others who failed on the first attempt. Figure 
3 shows the portion of users in the winner and loser group who had 2, 3, 4 … j attempts. 
Both groups have a heavy tailed distribution of attempts: the majority of users have a 
couple of attempts and a handful of users attempt many tasks. One can observe that, on 
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time to the end time of a task), so that a user who submits at the very beginning has a 
submission time of 0, and one who submits at the end has a submission time of 1. 
Table 5: Comparison between the number of submissions 
for first time winners and losers 
  
Winners in 1st 
attempt 
Losers in 1st 
attempt 
Mean 4.388817 3.20194 
Variance 85.02092 25.54748 
Observations 2307 169456 
P(T<=t) two-tail 8.04E-10  
t Critical two-tail 1.960985   
We find that, for all users, task award correlates with users submitting solutions later. It 
may be an indication that people are more intent on winning higher awards ( = 0.067, 
sig. <10-4) and so either take longer to devise a solution or “sit” on it until they are 
certain it is their best effort. Interestingly, tasks of longer duration have a slightly later 
submission time (relative to the overall duration (= .026, sig. <10-4). One possible 
explanation is that users may notice the task after it has started and still have sufficient 
time to submit a solution. 
Furthermore, we find that the number of submissions is negatively correlated with the 
time when people submit ( = -.128, sig. <10-4). A simple reason could be that most 
tasks with many submissions require little effort, and so users can complete and submit 
solutions sooner. An alternate explanation could be that when people see that many 
others have participated in the task, they may not want to follow up. This would result in 
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number of views and number of submissions for a task and the average experience of 
the user. 
We can further run a regression for the submission order of a user, as related to the 
recency of a task, represented by the order in which it appeared, and the total number of 
submissions for the task. We find that both variables are significant (sig. <10-4), with  
later submissions by users naturally corresponding to more recently posed tasks, but in 
addition also corresponding to less popular tasks. 
Given that users tend to adopt the same strategy of choosing less popular tasks, it is of 
little surprise that experienced users find themselves attending to the same tasks. If we 
select two users at random for each task, we observe a positive correlation ( = 0.13, sig. 
<10-4) for the number of submissions by each of the two users. This implies that 
inexperienced users are more likely to go up against other inexperienced users who are 
making their first attempts, while the old timers are likely to find themselves in the 
company of other old-timers. 
Beyond simply attempting to increase their odds of winning, we find that the more 
experienced users have even more interesting selection criteria. Using the human-rated 
sample of 157 tasks, we find that, on average, experienced users are more likely to 
participate in tasks with a higher skill requirement ( = 0.253, sig. = 0.002). In addition, 
the higher workload of the task actually hinders experienced users from attempting the 
task ( = -0.242, sig. = 0.003). The result suggests that the serious users of the site have a 
combination of multiple strategies when choosing the next task to participate in. In 
addition to selecting tasks of higher winning probability and expected award, they also 
tend to challenge themselves by participating in tasks requiring greater skill; but they are 
thrifty with their effort by selecting tasks of lower workload.  
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result is consistent with our previous finding that the best predictor of whether an 
individual will win is the size of the competition, only then followed by the expertise of 
the user. Winners are simply better at executing this strategy.  
5. Conclusion 
We observed several characteristics in users’ activity over time on Taskcn that have 
implications for crowdsourcing and similar phenomena. On Witkey sites, many 
participants are willing to put their solutions forward in exchange for a chance to win 
payment. What is more, the requester of the task benefits by being able to choose 
among different solutions. While some designers perceive such sites as encouraging 
“spec work”, there is little doubt that Witkeys present an open marketplace to match 
workers with tasks, where it makes sense for the workers to present up-front effort. 
The patterns we observe hold clues to both the success of a freelance marketplace and 
crowdsourcing, and raise interesting design implications for such sites. On Taskcn, most 
users become inactive after only a few submissions. Others keep attempting tasks. 
Among those users, we see different behaviors. Over time, users will tend to select tasks 
where they are competing against fewer opponents, to increase their chances of winning. 
They will also, perhaps counterproductively, select tasks with higher expected rewards. 
However, on average, they do not increase their chances of winning, and in some 
categories of tasks, their chances actually decrease. This does not paint the full picture, 
however, because there is a very small core of successful users who manage not only to 
win multiple tasks, but to increase their win-to-submission ratio over time. Whether this 
is a case of the rich getting richer, since their successful wins give them a reputation that 
may enhance the chances that their submission is selected, or whether it true evidence of 
learning, remains unclear.  
The design implications of this work are important:  it is likely that it will be necessary to 
incentivize this core group of winners in order to maintain their continued presence on 
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the site.  It should be possible to identify and reward these users.  For example, one 
could modify the interface to guide users to less popular tasks, or ones that match their 
particular expertise based on prior tasks they participated in. It is also likely to be critical 
to identify promising participants early (perhaps earlier than is currently possible on 
Taskcn), since many people leave after only a couple of task attempts.  Furthermore, 
given the way that Taskcn works, it is critical to continue to drive large numbers of 
prospective members towards the site, since those members may over time become a 




Chapter 3  
A Sustainable Mechanism for Baidu 
Knows 
1. Introduction 
Across the globe, community-based online Question-and-Answer (Q&A) sites have been 
rapidly accumulating knowledge and expertise to serve as vast knowledge repositories. 
Examples include Yahoo! Answers in English, Naver in Korean, and Baidu Knows in 
Chinese. All these sites generate both demand and supply for people’s knowledge and 
expertise, accommodating a large number of users of diverse interests and expertise,  
forming thriving online communities on a tremendous scale. For example, the site we 
investigate here, Baidu Knows, has answered over 47 million questions since 2005 and 
receives more than 47,000 questions per day. 
Although Baidu Knows and Yahoo! Answers have very similar technical platform, there 
are several critical differences that are likely to cause different user behavior and site 
performance. First, Baidu Knows allows askers to award extra points to award the best 
answer, which gives askers the potential to provide higher and more flexible incentives 
than flat points. In addition, Baidu Knows intentionally establishes a "sense of 
community" by enhancing people’s social interactions (e.g., providing feedback to 
answerers and an instant messaging service). It also tries to promote community 
awareness with its prominent honor title system and by explicitly promoting experts.   
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Interestingly, Baidu Knows has made a system with mechanism that is sustainable 
because it addresses people’s incentives. On other sites, users can largely be separated 
into disjoint groups of askers and answerers, but on Baidu Knows a significant portion of 
users participate as both askers and answerers. These users are most likely motivated by 
the incentive design. Here, we investigate how users spread over multiple categories: 
which categories do they ask in and which categories do they answer in? In general, we 
found that users asked in more categories than they answered in. And users tend to 
spend their time unevenly, spending a lot of time in a few categories while very little in 
other categories.    
Baidu Knows’ incentive system is clearly at work. Askers post higher prices for questions 
they value more, and these questions bring more answers. We found that askers 
gradually improved their asking efficiency over time (answers per point given). 
Answerers, on the other hand, learn over time to discover less competitive questions, 
give fuller answers, be more focused, which end up winning them more rewards. Finally, 
we found that the only-answering group—although less active—are seeking more 
challenging questions and performing better than others. This strongly suggests that 
they are motivated by the community features, rather than the point system.  
This chapter first introduces Baidu Knows and the dataset. Then it examines how the 
reward mechanism works and how users behave differently according to their activity 
level. In particular, we look into the participation pattern of the core group in the 
community that both asks and answers questions. We then discuss our findings and 
related work, and we conclude with a discussion of design implications and future work. 
2. Baidu Knows and Data Set 
Founded in 2005, Baidu Knows (BK) is the biggest Chinese Q&A community. About 83 
million questions have been submitted and 47 million have been resolved. BK’s format is 
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The site has two hierarchical category levels including 24 meta-categories and 
approximately 300 subcategories. Meta-categories include, for example, Health, 
Computer/Internet, and Fashion/Life. The Computer/Internet meta-category includes 
C++, viruses, and downloading sub-categories.  Askers assign questions to a category 
when they posting questions. Of course, some users incorrectly categorize their 
questions, but the system tries to correct that by suggesting categories after users type 
keywords. The system also tries to avoid redundant questions by automatically 
generating relevant solved questions. 
Baidu Know’s point system works by giving to users when they log onto the site and 
answer questions. BK also allows askers to offer extra points to the person who provides 
the best answer. This mechanism encourages more and better answers, and it 
encourages askers to earn more points in order to be able ask. In addition to gaining 
points, users can also gain “ranks.” BK uses an honor-title system that includes five 
different themes: business titles (e.g., from trainee to CEO), traditional Chinese imperial 
examination titles, magical titles, knight-errant titles, and traditional Chinese military 
titles. The site also explicitly promotes outstanding contributors. For example, it selects 
experts who perform well in particular categories as the "knowledge master" and "star of 
Knows" each week, and provides links to their profile pages from the portal or category 
index pages. BK also publicizes users who have been newly promoted. These promotions 
give users more incentive to garner points, find acknowledgement, accumulate fame, 
and contribute on the site over time. 
The site consciously builds a sense of community by enhancing the social bonds 
between participants. First, people often give themselves meaningful user IDs and the 
titles they earn are attached to those IDs, giving that person a user identity.  
For example, CEO "Wind karma wind words" is a user who has answered 3,278 questions 
and ben chosen for best answer 1,360 times. The ID also links to the profile page with ID 
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In this dataset, only 56% of submitted questions were actually resolved. On average each 
question received 3.33 replies. This is lower than YA, where the rate is 7.27, but it is 
better than Naver (1.7). About 55% of users on BK only ask questions, while askers and 
answerers on YA are fairly balanced. That means that if we calculate the number of 
questions generated per unit of population, BK users tend to have many more questions 
than YA users (Adamic et al., 2008). Figure 14 shows the distribution of the three types of 
users: the percent that both asks and answers is similar to YA, but significantly higher 
than Naver, where people tend to be either answerers or askers. As we will discuss 
below, the group of users who both ask and answer forms the core of the practicing 
community, and they actively participate across categories, seeking and offering 
knowledge and expertise. 
3. Incentives 
Incentive design is crucial for knowledge-sharing communities to attract contributions. 
All sites offer some form of explicit incentive. YA gives users points for answering and 
more points for being chosen as the best answer, BK and Naver allow askers to award 
extra points from their own account, and Taskcn offers real money for the best solutions.  
While some field studies have compared different incentive schemes (Chen et al., 2010; 
Harper et al., 2008), we wanted to know whether virtual points (instead of money) 
actually encourage contributions, and whether the point incentive would have different 
efficiencies in different ranges. 
We found a correlation between the awarded points and number of answers for all 
questions (= 0.24, sig.<10-4) and when we limited our analysis to only the questions 
that offered extra points ( = 0.26, sig.< 10-4). Correlations were very consistent among 
the different meta-categories. Figure 15 shows how many answers questions of different 
values obtained on average and it is clearly chows a linear trend. In sum, points have a 
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 DoBoth users are more active than users who only ask or only answer: they asked 
almost half of the total questions with an average of 4.1 questions per user; which 
is significantly more than the group who only asked. In addition, they answered 
more than the group who only answered (the mean of DoBoth is 15.3 while 
purely answering users have a mean of 9.2). 
 DoBoth users offer higher awards when asking (the mean of the award points is 
12.3, which is significantly higher than average). They share the same trend in 
terms of paying points for each question with the general askers; however, they 
pay higher each time.  
 DoBoth users’ winRate falls below that of users who only answer; their answers 
are shorter (mean=258; compared to 296) and they choose less challenging 
questions (award and number of competing answers for the question) 
(mean=3.8; compared to 3.9).  This suggests that users who only answer may on 
average be selective in the questions they choose to answer. 
From the observation that those who ask more tend to answer more (log#ask to 
log#answer,  = .26, sig.<10-4) and similarly that those who spend more points also earn 
more (log#point-earned to log#point-spent,  = .19, sig.<10-4); we may surmise that 
DoBoth users are incentivized to answer questions by the fact that they also need points 
to ask them. This group of users participates intensively and forms a sustainable core 
dynamic of traders in expertise. 
Community across Categories 
Consequently, it is important to examine how this dynamic takes place. We construct a 
users’ social network by the help links from asker to answerer and we employ Bowtie 
analysis (Broder et al. 2000) to learn how users are connected through asking and 
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answer given. Finally, for the subset of 24,094 users who asked exactly as often as they 
answered; the averages are (0.76 versus 0.64). This all points to there being more 
subjects that individuals need help on, than subjects where they are expert. The power of 
the Q&A forums is that collectively, the users have expertise in all areas. 
Category Concentration 
Given that many users participate in multiple categories, we were interested in whether 
some categories more focused users than others. We use "concentration ratio" which is 
defined as the number of questions in one category divided by all questions one has 
asked/answered. For example, if a user asked 10 questions in "food" and she has asked 
100 questions in total, then her ratio for asking in this category is 10%. 
Overall, users have highly skewed distribution in each category as many other sites. We 
can also see a difference among categories: for example, the "computer" and "game" 
categories gather the highest concentration and a few users only ask/answer within 
these categories; while in "travel" and "food" users tend to just visit shortly. This implies 
people’s various information needs and where user would largely interact with similar 
people and where they would potentially meet more diverse others. 
Comparing concentration distributions for asking and answering (Figures 32 and 33), 
answering patterns present higher concentration in general; and we see more highly 
focused answerers in each category too.  
6. Conclusions and Future work 
In this chapter, we studied a large scale Q&A system, Baidu Knows, in order to 
understand how such a system is sustaining and thriving. We find that the system has 
successfully accommodated people’s various information needs and multiple levels of 
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The growing popularity of peer-based knowledge sites has attracted considerable 
research interests in recent years. Studies have found that users’ participation and 
contribution is highly skewed on many online communities, including Yahoo! Answers, 
Wikipedia (Adler & Alfaro, 2007), Del.icio.us (Golder & Huberman, 2006), and Flickr 
(Marlow et al., 2006). In addition, most of contributions are made by a small minority of 
the participants, and this group of users usually have better performance as described by 
Welser et al. (2007), Adler and Alfaro (2007) and Yang et al. (2008 b). The participation 
structure on BK also shares this pattern in terms of skewness. However, there is a core 
user group who is not extreme on either asking or answering, nor do they necessarily 
perform better, contributes the most to the site. 
This group of users is essentially motivated by the need of points to ask questions. In 
addition to monetary incentives such as in previous chapter and in Harper et al. (2008),   
we found that the virtual points can significantly incentivize answerers too. We also 
attribute this in part to the importance of having a high titled identity in the community, 
which can be achieved through accumulating points; especially as we see the only-
answerers seek to answer high-awarded questions. How this title system incentivizes 
contribution would be studied in future work. 
In the previous study we investigated how users price the tasks to recruit solutions, and 
we found that the price correlates with the expertise required for completing the task. In 
the form of virtual points, askers on BK pay different amounts for different questions: 
there are category difference and sequence difference in terms of when the question is 






Survival Patterns in Online Knowledge 
Sharing Communities 
Chapter 3 presents one example of Internet-scale Q&A sites, Baidu Knows, in terms of 
how the virtual point design encourages users to improve their strategy and 
performance. We would like to know more about what keeps these kinds of communities 
going. Due to the sheer size of their populations, Internet-scale Q&A communities might 
suffer more from sparse social interactions and thus low levels of commitment. However, 
relatively little is known about motivating people over the long run in online 
communities. A few studies have focused on what makes help sharing systems 
sustainable over time (e.g., Ackerman & Palen, 1996), and some work has investigated 
this problem in Internet-scale communities. Joyce and Kraut (2006) investigated 
newcomers’ retention across six newsgroups and found interrelations among 
newcomers’ initial post properties, reply properties, and the probability of posting again. 
Arguello et al. (2006) conducted a similar study with eight Usenet newsgroups, 
comparing the interaction patterns between newcomers and old timers, and found that 
they differ in their ability to get replies and in the ways they write messages. In an 
exploration of the online forum Slashdot, Lampe and Johnston (2005) found that how a 
newcomer’s post is rated and moderated affects her probability of returning.  
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These studies, however, are limited. They largely consider initial participation, and 
commitment is measured only to the second post. In this chapter, on the other hand, I 
examine users’ participation lifespans to assess how systems might sustain users for the 
long term. As I will discuss, survival analysis shows that participation patterns and 
performance factors can account for considerable variance in predicting participation 
lifespan.  
As well, this is a comparison study across three major Q&A sites (the three sites 
mentioned above). Thus, this is not only the first user retention study on Internet-scaled 
Q&A sites, but also the first comparison study among these three large communities.  
1. Data and Methods 
Data Description 
As mentioned, I investigated three Internet-scale Q&A sites across languages and 
cultures: Yahoo! Answers (YA) in English, Baidu Knows (BK) in Chinese, and Naver 
Knowledge-IN (NK) in Korean. NK, started in 2002, was the earliest, while YA and BK were 
launched a short time apart in 2005. All three experienced a boom in user population 
and traffic starting in 2006. The set of sites is well suited to a comparative study, since 
they are similar in scale, purpose, and basic functionality. They, however, vary in cultural 
context, incentive structure, and site design, which might potentially influence users’ 
participation patterns and social interactions on each site.  
All of these sites presented challenges in collecting data.  Below I briefly describe each 
site and its data collection.  We were limited to two years of use at each site for reasons 
we will explain below.  
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Yahoo! Answers (YA) is an online knowledge sharing community website launched by 
Yahoo! in Dec 2005. YA sites exist in various languages, but we limit our analysis to the 
English site, which is by far the largest.  
YA, like NK and BK, allows any user to ask or answer a question and provides a virtual 
point system to realize its knowledge market. Users pay a flat fee in virtual points to ask 
a question and can recover some of those points by selecting the best answer among 
those received in response to the question. If the asker does not select a best answer, it 
is selected by votes from other users. On the answerer side, a small number of points are 
awarded for contributing an answer, and a bigger, flat number of points for being 
selected as best. The total number of points earned, as well as the percentage of a user’s 
answers that were selected as best are displayed in a user’s profile.  
Using YA APIs, we were able to crawl all questions in each category and the 
corresponding users within the first year after the launch of the site. However, we could 
not reach questions posted in the second year using this method. Instead, we used a 
random sample of 150K users from Adamic et al. (2008) over a period of three months 
starting a month into YA’s second year.  
 Baidu Knows (BK) founded in June 2005, is the largest Chinese Q&A online community. 
As successful as its co-named search engine in China, BK has garnered a huge user base 
and traffic. To date, more than 100 million questions have been asked with more than 
half of them successfully solved (i.e., the best answer was chosen by the asker or voted 
on by other users).  
As YA’s Chinese peer, BK shares many features with YA such as using virtual point system 
as well as some deviations listed in Table 6. Our BK data includes a full history of the first 
two years of the site, including all undeleted questions and answers (57 million posts in 
total), with corresponding users.   
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Table 6: General site comparison 
 YA BK NK1 
Founded in 2005/12 2005/6 2002 
Incentive for 
answering 
Earn flat point rate Earn flat point rate+ flexible points 
Incentive for asking Pay flat rate of points Earn flat rate of points, but optionally 
offer extra flexible points 
 
Table 7: Data description & general characteristics of the sites 
Year 1 YA BK NK 
#sampled users 6841 14,683 6,460 
Ave # ques per asker 14.3 4.9 4.64 
Ave # ans per answerer 217.1 26.08 7.01 
Ave # ans per question 12.1 6 3 
%asker 54.1% 54% 21.4% 
%answerer 7.1% 10.4% 43.5% 
%doBoth 38.8% 35.6% 35.1% 
Year 2 YA BK NK 
#sampled users 72,099 18,871 61,177 
Ave # ques per asker 5.32 4.17 1.78 
Ave # ans per answerer 51.33 16.61 5.44 
Ave # ans per question 12.71 5.1 1.72 
%asker 59.3% 58.1% 60.5% 
%answerer 6.8% 12.4% 24.7% 
%doBoth 33.9% 29.5% 14.8% 
 
                                                            




Naver Knowledge-iN (NK) is the largest online Q&A community in South Korea. The 
site has over 43 million questions2. Since Naver’s API access to NK data is restrictive, we 
manually crawled 2.6 million questions and their answers from 15 categories between 
2002 and 2007.  The data collection technique we used is described in Nam et al. (2009). 
The site differences are summarized in Table 6. Table 7 presents the data description of 
the sampled users who joined each site during the first three month of each year. We 
can see that while there are some noticeable discrepancies between the years, the site 
differences are significant: YA users contributed significantly more in terms of both 
asking and answering than BK and NK users, which resulted in a higher average number 
of answers each question obtained. In addition, there are always more doBoth users 
(who had both asked and answered during the observation period) in YA.  
Survival Analysis 
Survival analysis (Cox & Oaks, 1984) is the main method in this study to measure the 
lifespan of users’ participation. The technique has been widely used in biological and 
medical science, engineering, and sociology. It involves modeling of a lifetime against a 
specific event. In particular, For example, two applications include how many days a 
cancer patient will survive (against death) and how long a marriage will last (against 
divorce). Note that survival analysis must deal properly with censored data, or where the 
event has not occurred before the end of the observation period. In our context, a user 
“survives” on the site if they keep participating. As demonstrated in the sections below, 
survival analysis can test the difference in participation lifespan between groups and 
quantify individual predictors using a Cox proportional-hazards regression model. 
Defining Lifespan. In our context, users “survive” on the site if they keep participating. 
Defining lifespan with respect to participation is tricky because, unlike actual death or 
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include only users whose first post occurs in the first three months of either year (as 
described in Table 7). Therefore, we have a range of 9 to 12 months to observe how long 
a user continues to participate. At the end of the observation period we then can assign 
each individual’s life status as either dead or censored. A censored user is one who has 
not exceeded the cutoff interval of inactivity at the conclusion of the observation period 
and can thus still be considered alive. Survival analysis allows us to properly account for 
censored data. 
Identifying Participation Patterns 
We define the following variables which were used in the statistical tests to predict users’ 
lifespans.  
Two other variables describe users’ asking and answering activity. One is the ask/reply 
ratio (A/R ratio) representing users’ preference between asking and replying to 
questions (as defined below). The second, netPoints, is defined as the net point balance: 










Table 8: Variables of participation pattern 
Asking Variables Description 
# Questions # questions user asked during a period of 
time, indicating activity level of asking 
# Answers/Q Ave. # answers obtained per question, 
indicating ability to get answers 
Len_Ans Ave. length of answers obtained 
%Answered (BK) Whether the question has >= 1 answer 
%Solved (BK) Whether a best answer was selected (either 
by the asker or by a vote) 
# Points Ave. # points user offered per question 
%chosenBest (NK) Whether best answer is chosen by asker 
%userChosenBest(NK) Whether best answer is chosen by others 
 
Answering Variables Description 
# Questions # questions answered during a period of 
time, indicating activity level of answering 
# Answers Ave. # answers for each question, indicating 
level of competition 
Len_Ans Ave. length of answers 
# win # times that user’s answer was selected as 
best 
winRate # win/#question 
Guru winRate incorporating question 
competitiveness 
Points earned Ave. # points earned per question 
answered 
Points expected (Ave. points offered for each question the 
user answered)/(# questions) 
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exponentiated coefficient indicates the direction of the effect: when larger than 1, it 
presents a negative relationship between the variable and estimate of lifespan. It 
presents a positive relationship when smaller than 1. For example the exp(coef) for YA is 
2.497, meaning that when the A/R ratio is higher, then the lifespan is shorter (i.e., users 
who primarily ask questions tend to leave earlier). Pr(>|z|) indicates the statistical 
significance; R2 is the strength of correlation. 
Table 9: Correlating survival and A/R ratio 
 exp(coef) Pr(>|z|) R2  
YA 2.497 <0.001 *** 0.125  
BK 3.297 <0.001 *** 0.147  
NK 1.591 <0.001 *** 0.040  
The results are consistent across all three sites: users who stay longer prefer answering to 
asking. Also consistent with Figure 36, this difference is more pronounced in YA and BK 
than NK. This is a corroboration of what one might intuitively assume: Answerers 
demonstrate much greater commitment to Q&A communities, by contributing more and 
staying significantly longer.  
How First Time Experience Matters 
As mentioned, previous work measured the effect of the first interaction experience on 
the probability of a user’s returning to the online forum. Here we extend the analysis 
past the probability of returning once to quantifying the degree to which the initial 
interaction correlates with the length of the entire lifespan of a user’s participation. 
Table 10: First time action preference in year 1 and year 2 
1st action YA1 YA2 BK1 BK2 NK1 NK2 
= asking 63.7% 73.8% 73.4% 74% 36.5% 68.4% 
= answering 36.3% 26.2% 26.6% 26% 63.5% 31.6% 
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Since users can take two different initial actions, asking or answering, we examine them 
separately and predict user’ participation lifespan using variables corresponding to 
asking and answering. Table 10 presents the ratio of users who initially ask to those who 
initially answer for the three sites. Except for year 1 of NK, all sites present a significantly 
larger preference for asking as the initial action. Interestingly, BK is rather stable between 
the two years, and YA and NK gained a larger portion of users who joined by asking first. 
It may reflect changes in how users initially discover the sites (e.g. by being routed from 
a search engine while performing a query) or new community-oriented services and 
designs. It may even reflect initial social instability in new sites.  
Predicting activity lifespan by the first question asked. Table 11 presents the results 
of Cox proportional-hazards regressions on user lifespan using individual variables and 
the overall multiple regression using all predictor variables relating to the question. The 




Table 11: Predicting lifespan by first asking activity 
YA 
Individual predictor variables  
 exp(coef) z Pr(>|z|)  R2 
#answers 0.9817 -4.979 < .001 *** 0.006 
Len_Ans 1 -1.558 0.119 0.001 
Len_Ques 0.9994 -6.188 < .001 *** 0.01 
Multiple R2= 0.015, p < .001  
BK 
#answers 0.941 -10.84 < .001 *** 0.013 
Len_Ans 0.9999 -5.445 < .001 *** 0.004 
Len_Ques 0.9956 -9.817 < .001 *** 0.011 
?answered 0.6573 -16.31 < .001 *** 0.026 
?solved 0.5648 -20.33 < .001 *** 0.043 
# Points 0.9982 -1.546 0.122 0 
Multiple R2= 0.049 , p=0 
NK 
#answers 1.010 0.729 0.466 0 
?chosenBest 1.397 0.747 0.455 0 
?userChosenBest 1.273 2.266 0.024 * 0.002 





Table 12: Predicting lifespan by first answering activity 
YA 
Individual predictor variables  
 exp(coef) z Pr(>|z|)  R2 
#Ans 1.01 0.827 0.408 0 
?Win 0.8015 -4.07 < .001 *** 0.007  
Multiple R2 = 0.007, p < .001 *** 
BK 
#Ans 1 0.65 0.516 0 
?Win 0.9217 -3.097 0.002 ** 0.001 
earnedPoints 0.9985 -1.824 0.068 0 
Len_Ans 1 0.032 0.974 0 
?best_Commented 0.9042 -3.377 < .001 *** 0.001 
Multiple R2 = 0.001,   p=0.0238 
NK 
#Ans 1.014 1.762 0.078 0.001 
%Win 0.98 -0.622 0.534 0 
Multiple R2= 0.001,   p=0.214 
In BK, whether the best answer was chosen, either by the asker or by voting, is the most 
significant factor that results in longer lifespan for the asker. In addition, obtaining more 
answers (in YA and BK) and longer replies (in BK) for the initial question also encourages 
askers to stay longer. As indicators of the level of investment on the part of the asker, 
writing longer questions (on YA and BK) and offering more points (on BK), can not only 
attract more answers, but are also positively associated with longevity. 
Predicting activity lifespan by the first answer. Similarly, we predicted lifespan for 
those users who started by answering questions (shown in Table 12). The results show 
very limited prediction power with small R2 for YA and BK; the variables remain non-
significant for NK.   
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Consistently between YA and BK, having one’s answer selected to be the best is a 
promising sign for a longer lifespan. On BK, earning points also had positive effect, and 
importantly, getting feedback about the answers from the asker (?best_Commented) also 
was correlated with users staying longer.  
Participation Patterns That Predict Lifespan 
Next we look past the first interaction to see how users’ continued participation patterns 
can be used to predict total lifespans on the site. These patterns can be only observed 
and identified through a period of time. For example, users’ performance can be 
measured as the average points earned per question answered.  
Thus, we selected users who had stayed for more than 30 days and used the variables 
obtained during this period of time to predict how long those users would continue to 
participate. The results show that users’ aggregate participation patterns can yield 
considerably more predictive power than using just a user’s initial experience. 
Predicting asking lifespan by the first 30 days. We first predict users’ asking lifespans, 
based on their asking patterns in the first 30 days of participation (shown in Table 13). 
First, on all three sites, those who asked more questions remained longer after the 30 
days, and this accounts for a significant portion of total explained variance. On NK, this 
difference in activity level accounts for the majority of prediction. This may imply that NK 
is less capable of sustaining low-use users for the long term, while the other two sites 




Table 13: Predicting asking lifespan by first 30 days 
YA 
Individual predictor variables  
 exp(coef) z Pr(>|z|)  R2 
# Question 0.972 -10.49 < .001 *** 0.056 
Ave# Answer 0.982 -2.857 0.004 ** 0.003 
Len_Ans 1.000 -0.935 0.35 0 
Len_Ques 1.000 -2.455 0.014 * 0.002 
A/R ratio 0.598 -10.08 < .001 *** 0.036 
Multiple R2= 0.09, p=0 
BK 
# Question 0.800 -38.12 < .001 *** 0.194 
Ave# Answer 0.880 -23.86 < .001 *** 0.058 
Len_Ans 1.000 -13.79 < .001 *** 0.022 
Len_Ques 0.991 -21.96 < .001 *** 0.052 
%answered 0.417 -32.61 < .001 *** 0.089 
%solved 0.347 -36.99 < .001 *** 0.116 
Ave_offerPoint 1.000 0.202 0.84 0 
A/R ratio 3.442 38.03 < .001 *** 0.121 
Net_Points 1.080 67.33 < .001 *** 0.292 
Multiple R2= 0.392,  p=0 
NK 
# Question 0.7688 -27.34 < .001 *** 0.372 
Ave# Answer 0.9681 -2.326 0.0200 * 0.002 
%chosenBest 1.277 0.686 0.493 0 
%userChosenBest 1.577 3.672 < .001 *** 0.004 
A/R ratio 1.432 6.339 < .001 *** 0.012 
Net_Points 0.9886 -2.75 < .001 *** 0.002 




Table 14: Predicting answering lifespan by first 30 days 
YA 
 exp(coef) z Pr(>|z|)  R2 
# Question 0.998 -6.452 < .001 *** 0.029 
Ave#Ans 0.999 -0.388 0.698 0 
#win 0.994 -4.85  < .001 *** 0.016 
winRate 0.840 -1.697 0.090 0.002 
guru 0.894 -2.472  0.013 * 0.003 
A/R ratio 8.181 13.66 < .001 *** 0.075 
Multiple R2= 0.091, p=0 
BK 
# Question 0.977 -19.49 < .001 *** 0.1 
Ave# Answer 1.001 5.745 < .001 *** 0.005 
#win 0.946 -13.56 < .001 *** 0.053 
winRate 0.802 -3.868 < .001 *** 0.003 
guru 0.986 -1.684 0.092  0.001 
Ave_earned_Point 0.997 -1.549 0.121 0 
Ave_expectedPoint 1.002 4.822 < .001 *** 0.004 
Len_Ans 1.000 -2.175 0.030 * 0.001 
%best_Commented 0.840 -2.351 0.019 * 0.001 
A/R ratio 1.519 7.937 < .001 *** 0.01 
Net_Points 1.023 47.77 < .001 *** 0.14 
Multiple R2= 0.488, p=0 
NK 
# Question 0.9073 -30.11 < .001 *** 0.335 
Ave# Answer 0.9263 -8.385 < .001 *** 0.015 
winRate 0.9128 -2.059 0.040 * 0.001 
guru 0.965 -2.308 0.021 * 0.001 
A/R ratio 0.9384 -0.986 0.324 0 
Net_Points 0.9856 -6.737 < .001 *** 0.009 
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Multiple R2= 0.371, p=0 
Some aspects of the general experience are important. Askers who continuously put in 
more effort (as measured by the average questions length) will also stay longer.  As well, 
across the three sites, getting more answers each time is correlated with the asker’s 
continued participation. On BK, getting longer answers and the proportion of questions 
being answered (demonstrating a greater effort on the part of the community) 
encouraged askers to keep asking. Considering that almost 45% of questions have never 
been solved on BK, we can imagine many askers being discouraged by obtaining no 
answer. However on NK, where both the asker and other users can select one of the 
answers as best, whether the asker made a selection is not statistically significant, while 
other users selecting the best answer, for reasons unclear to us, actually has a negative 
effect on lifespan.  
Preference for role was mixed. On BK and NK, a user who prefers asking tended to 
continue asking. However, on YA, she would be less likely to continue asking (Table 13, 
rows for A/R ratio). This might imply the more marked tendency of YA users to switch 
roles between asking and answering; there is larger portion of users on YA who have 
both asked and answered (Table 7).   
The incentive structure also had a mixed effect. Net point balance had a different effect 
size and direction between BK and NK. (We were unable to collect best answer 
selections, and therefore point balances, for YA.) For BK the factor yields a high 
predictive power. This might imply that on BK, net point surplus could also yield a 
negative effect in sustaining users.  
Predicting answering lifespan by the first 30 days. Similarly, activity level in answering 
(#questions in the 30 days) is also an important factor for staying longer (see Table 14). 
Furthermore, users’ performance in answering (as measured by #win, winRate, or guru 
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To examine this further, we conducted human coding to evaluate a random sample of BK 
and YA questions. To control the variance across categories, we sampled 80 questions 
from each of two meta-categories of YA and BK: “Entertainment” and 
“Computer/Internet,” which should represent conversational and informational topics 
respectively. Raters rated each question with all of its answers, in terms of how the 
question is asked and answered. This integrated question-answering process is evaluated 
on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (information seeking and providing objective 
information) to 5 (social discussion and conversation with subjective opinions and 
attitude). The Spearman inter-rater correlation was 0.83. 
As predicated across sites, “Computer/Internet” categories tend to be more about 
information seeking and offering, while “entertainment” categories tend to be more 
social and conversational in terms of both the contents and interaction patterns. In 
addition, we found that both categories in YA have higher average scores than those of 
BK, as shown in Figure 40. The matched differences between the sites are statistically 
significant. This suggests that in general YA’s question-answering interactions tend to be 
more social conversational, consistent with the observation that YA has significantly 
more answers per question on average, and might also help explain why YA users tend 
to more frequently switch between asker and answerer roles.  
Both the properties of questions being asked and the patterns of answering questions 
contribute to the Q&A sites’ dynamics. BK users ask more questions seeking objective 
information, prominently questions regarding online resources and computer assistance 
(e.g., Where can I download XXX?); YA users like to raise discussion topics to garner 
others’ opinions or simply for fun (e.g., What is your favorite website besides this one? 
Or, have you lived an enchanted life?). On the answering side, we observe that compared 
to BK users who merely provide answers, YA users tend to add more humor, offer 
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In this chapter we used Survival Analysis to compare users’ participation lifespan and 
social interaction pattern across the three major Q&A sites. First, we examined 
participation roles, finding consistently across sites that users who preferred answering 
tend to have a longer, more active life within the site.  
While retaining these more committed users helps sustain the Q&A community, 
generating enough questions for them to answer is also important. As might be 
expected, askers tend to stay longer if they can get better, more numerous, and longer 
responses. It is unclear, however, how much of the askers’ lifespan is explained by others’ 
responses, and how much of it is explained by the askers’ intrinsic motivation. Askers 
who put in more effort, in terms of the number and average length of questions they 
write, both get more answers and tend to stay longer.  
Answerers who get acknowledgement of their contributions by having answers selected 
as best or commented on tend to stay longer. This implies a potential need to reinforce 
the dynamics of information seeking and perhaps offering ways to improve both the 
askers and answerers’ experience (for example, a routing system).  
In contrast to earlier studies, which focused on users’ initial interactions, we find that 
such interactions were only very weak predictors of user participation in the long time—
and only for two of the sites. Users whose first action is to ask are a bit more predictable 
than those who first post an answer. This suggests that askers are more sensitive to how 
their first interaction goes. Thus, in order to help keep new arrivals, it might be useful to 
help first-time askers by offering help or wizards about how to formulate and post a 
successful question. 
There are also some intriguing differences between the sites.  The most noticeable cross-
site difference we found was that answerers tend to be more active in providing answers 
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on YA, while askers ask a similar number of questions on all three sites. There is a higher 
rate of answers per question on YA compared to BK and NK. In addition, YA users tend 
to stay on the site longer than BK and NK users, showing a stronger commitment to the 
Q&A community.  
We believe that there may be a subtle cause behind this difference: incentive design. 
Both BK and NK encourage asking by rewarding askers with points, while YA deducts 
points for asking questions and rewards answers. While incentivizing asking activity may 
have contributed to the incredible growth in question volume on BK, it might also bring 
issues such as high drop-off rates, and an insufficient supply of answers or even large 
numbers of unsolved questions. An additional possible factor for the high volume of 
questions with few answers, and the low retention of askers on NK and BK is that many 
casual askers may come to the sites through search portals provided by Baidu and Naver.  
By further looking into people’s Q&A interaction contents, we found that the interaction 
patterns on YA tend to be more conversational than BK. This might partially account for 
the higher answering contribution on YA. But how the sites developed different 
question-and-answering dynamics can be a complex result of design differences and 
cultural contexts. First, it might be that the incentive designs and flexible points on BK 
stamp out people’s intrinsic motivation to help and create social bonds. Instead, users 
may treat the site like a series of transactions. Second, the large amount of informational 
questions on BK could be because China often lacks comprehensive and up-to-date 
information sources for information like store hours, bus schedules, and phone numbers. 
Therefore, people spend more time asking other people these questions. In addition, the 
difference in the interaction dynamics also hints at potential cultural characteristics, as 
Westerners tend to be more willing to express their opinions and feelings and involve 





Virtual Currency in Supporting Social 
Exchange in a Cultural Context 
Various information services and systems (e.g. eBay, Orkut, and Yahoo!) have 
encountered serious challenges when entering China, an emergent and promising 
market with 400 million Internet users. We argue that in order to successfully localize, 
such services need not only adequately navigate the current Chinese economic and 
political landscape, but also need to account for the deeply rooted Chinese culture.   
To address the need to understand how Chinese culture interacts with online systems, in 
this chapter we present a case study of diverse social interactions among Chinese 
netizens, based on over 4 years of comprehensive data collected from an online bulletin 
board system (BBS), Mitbbs. Mitbbs is the most frequently used online forum for Chinese 
nationals who are studying or working abroad, primarily in the United States. Because 
Mitbbs is hosted in the US, it is less affected by censorship than forums located in China.  
Founded in 1998 by volunteers, Mitbbs was later commercialized and is supported 
through the sale of advertisements. However, in essence, it has been sustained by the 
hundreds of thousands of Chinese who are seeking both help and a sense of community 
during their stays abroad. Similar to the experience that most Chinese young people had 
with their college bulletin board systems (BBSs), i.e. participating in a virtual community 
and developing social networks, Mitbbs supports a significant part of its users’ 
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informational and social life abroad. This could be seen on the Anniversary board, 
created on the 10th anniversary of Mitbbs’ launch, where users have posted their 
experiences and memories of Mitbbs.  For example, a user, anvv, who had used Mitbbs 
throughout his ten years abroad, wrote a post titled “an ‘unknown’9 dream for ten years”. 
A community such as Mitbbs can succeed only if it can motivate users to exchange 
information and socialize. To this end, Mitbbs introduced “weibi,” a virtual currency 
system. For example, posts promoted to the front page earn their authors weibi. 
However, despite the limited and rather unimaginative initial prescribed use of weibi, the 
virtual currency system evolved to be an essential mechanism in Mitbbs because it 
supports critically important social interactions.  It is through the lens of weibi that we 
study social interactions in this community. 
As the virtual currency was adopted by Mitbbs’ users, its uses evolved in a very culturally 
specific manner:  It quickly began to serve as a mechanism for social exchange activities 
termed guanxi in Chinese.  Thus, the online social interactions can reflect real life Chinese 
social dynamics. Guanxi networking (to be explained further below) has been viewed as 
an “informal aspect of the institutional culture” (Walder, 1986) and a stimulus of social 
actions (Alston, 1989).  Virtual points, through their flexibility and ambiguity, allow users 
to carry out socially important and culturally nuanced guanxi behavior.  
This chapter is organized as follows. We first provide the literature background that is 
crucial to understanding the social interactions of Chinese users in Mitbbs.  We then 
introduce the Mitbbs system and show how its diverse social exchange is supported 
through the interaction between the virtual point system (weibi) and the guanxi 
networking dynamics.  Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings and conclude. 
                                                            




1. Literature Background 
We ground our study by describing three general streams of literature: cultural 
differences between Westerners and East Asians, including studies within CSCW, studies 
about guanxi in China, and virtual points in online communities. 
In inter-cultural sociology and cultural psychology, Westerners and East Asians are often 
categorized as belonging to two differing groups. In terms of this literature, Westerners 
tend to be labeled as more analytic while East Asians tend to be more holistic; and thus, 
Westerners are context-independent, more narrowly focused, and use formal logic, while 
East Asians are field-dependent, broadly focused, situational, and dialectical (Nisbett et 
al., 2001; Varnum et al., 2010). In terms of social orientation, Western cultures tend to 
value independence, individualism, autonomy, and self-achievement (Hofstede, 1980); in 
contrast, Asian cultures emphasize interdependence, harmony, relatedness, and 
connection (Hofstede, 1983; Singelis, 1994; Triandis, 1995). Cultures of independent-
orientation tend to view the self as bounded and separate from others, while 
interdependent-orientated cultures view the self as interconnected and encompassing 
important social relationships (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Thus Asian cultures are 
“characterized by belonging, mandating the fulfillment of obligations and responsibilities 
to others” (Heine et al., 1999). In addition, many generic differences associated with each 
culture may also interact with and shape the culture, such as value systems (Aristotelian 
vs. Confucian intellectual traditions) (Lloyd, 1996; Pye, 1985), religions (Dollinger, 1988), 
economic ideology (Ralston et al., 2007), and industrialization and geographic mobility 
(Kitayama et al., 2009).  
CSCW has generally followed this literature, although there is wide concern over its 
limitations for design. For example, Asian users have been found to prefer multi-party 
chat, audio-video chat, and emoticons in IM (Kayan et al., 2006), benefit more from rich 
communication media in negotiation (Veinott et al., 1999), and are less satisfied with 
asynchronous communication (Massey et al., 2001). Setlock and Fussell (2010) found that 
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Asians involve additional considerations when deciding on appropriate communication 
tools, especially on the ability to support social processes. Lindtner et al. (2009), however, 
points out that these contrast-focused approaches can force a problematic distinction 
between “here” (the West) and “there” (China).  Instead, as Lindtner et al. did in their 
study of gaming in Chinese Internet cafes, we focus here on specific Chinese practices 
around social exchange and their re-enactment in digital environments so as to avoid 
this reification.   
Central to our study of social exchange is the notion of guanxi. Guanxi is a major theme 
in social interactions in Chinese society. Those familiar with Chinese culture would not 
doubt its importance, but Westerners find it hard to grasp. Essentially, guanxi describes 
the ties between an individual and others (Jacobs, 1980), fostered through exchanges of 
favors (Pye, 1982).  It is based in a sense of renqing, sometimes translated as harmonious 
relations.  As Yang states: 
An important feature of renqing principles is the notion 
of the necessity of reciprocity, obligation, and 
indebtedness in human relations. What activates reciprocal 
relations, what imbues relationships with a sense of 
obligation and indebtedness are the work of relational 
sentiments and ethics.  Concrete expressions of renqing 
are found especially in the gift-giving that goes on at 
special occasions such as birth, deaths, weddings, and New 
Year’s. (Yang, 1994, p. 122). 
Gift exchange plays an important role in establishing and sustaining guanxi networks. 
Yang (1994) and Yang (1996) in their ethnographic studies found two characteristics in 
guanxi to be prominent. First, reciprocal obligations for favors are assumed (Hwang, 
1987), and the interactions are designed to cultivate mutual dependence and 
manufacture obligation and indebtedness (Yang, 1994: p.6)). As Kipnis states (p.307): 
There is ... a congruence between the size of gifts, the 
burden of obligation, the strength of feeling that either 
existed or was hoped to develop, the closeness of the 
guanxi, and the dependability of the guanxi. 
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Second, gifts tend to be perceived as equivalent to money, and they can be circulated, 
calculated, and compared (e.g., cash gifts, gifts recycled to another person). 
According to Chiao (1982) and King (1991), guanxi is based on and enhanced by shared 
social experiences among individuals. For people in non-hierarchical or family 
relationships (i.e., among friends), guanxi connections are a primary mechanism of 
Chinese social life (Farh et al., 1998; Tsui & Farh, 1997). Guanxi is essentially “not only 
instrumentality and rational calculation, but also sociality, morality, intentionality, and 
personal affection” (Yang, 1994: p.88).  
Guanxi is also viewed in the sociology literature as a social mechanism substituting for 
formal institutions in current Chinese society (Xin & Pearce, 1996). “The structure of 
social relationships in China rests largely on fluid, person-centered social networks, 
rather than on fixed social institutions” (Yang, 1994: p.14). As mentioned, guanxi is 
difficult for Westerners to understand. While it can be compared to social capital 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Portes, 1998) in some ways, guanxi is more oriented toward dyadic 
relationships and is less societally structural, allowing guanxi networks to be freely 
connected and often bridge institutional boundaries (Yang, 1994). Therefore, social 
capital adheres to and affects (positively or negatively) a social unit, but guanxi networks 
are fluid and autonomous with respect to any institution. It might be noted that despite 
active research on social capital in Internet contexts, how guanxi networks evolve in 
Chinese online communities is understudied.  
Table 15 lists the Chinese terms that will be important to our discussion in this chapter, 
including a rough translation.  The reader is reminded that terms relating to Chinese 
culture seldom translate precisely to English, and it is important to focus on the Chinese 




Table 15: Important concepts important in Chinese culture  
Term Literal meaning Free translation 
renpin moral quality close to the  popular use of 
the term “karma” in the US 
RP same as renpin abbreviation of renpin 
(popular online slang) 
renqing human relationships human feelings, emotions, 
relationship, favor 
guanxi relationships ties between individual and 
others, through the 
exchanges of favor 
The third line of literature concerns virtual points and gifts in online communities. Virtual 
points are often used to motivated contribution and participation in question-answering 
(Q&A) forums. Interestingly, while the English site Yahoo! Answers used a fixed-point 
rate per question and answer, the two major Asian sites (Baidu Knows in China and 
Naver Knowledge-iN in Korea) allowed users to make variable point offerings to obtain 
answers. Yang and Wei (2009) found that more points can attract more answers in Baidu, 
and over time users learned to optimize point expended per answer gained in both 
Baidu (Yang & Wei, 2009) and Naver (Nam et al., 2009). Yang and Wei (2009) also 
revealed how Chinese users priced the questions differently based on topics and degrees 
of importance. Wang and Mainwaring (2008)’s study of virtual currency usage in the 
largest Chinese social service-Tencent QQ examined the perceived value of the virtual 
currency and its complex interaction with the currency type and the contexts of 
obtaining and spending the points. Finally Hjorth (2008) noted the pervasiveness of gift-
giving in Korean CyWorld use. These studies all hinted at a very diverse, flexible, and 
contextualized usage of virtual currency and other gifts to support the complex online 
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to access and discuss on other Chinese forums or websites due to censorship. They help 
one another by sharing information on various boards such as Job-hunting, Immigration, 
Next-generation (child-rearing), or Postdoc; share money-saving tips or conduct business 
on PenneySaver and eBiz; seek a romantic match through Pie-bridge10 and hobby-
buddies on forums such as Movie, Tennis, and Photography; meet local people on forums 
such as Michigan or Seattle; and find schoolmates on the alumni boards.   
When participating in discussions of sensitive topics, users may not want their ID and 
true identity to be linked. Majia, or alternative IDs (see Table 2), are thus frequently used.   
On the other hand, as in many other webboards, people on Mitbbs post images, 
including pictures of themselves. Posting a photo is a frequent self-disclosure activity, 
and the site explicitly encourages this through awarding points and holding various 
campaigns or contests. For example, people model their dresses on Fashion, show off 
their muscles on Fitness, pets in Pets, and even body parts on Sex. For example on Pets, 
jackyang posted some pictures of his son and dog: 
Ally (name of the dog) and his younger brother: taken 5 
months ago. [jackyang, 08-04-2010] 
Around twenty people replied, including: 
Wow, your son is so tall now, time passed so quickly, in 
just a second he went from a baby to a handsome boy. [Ted, 
08-04-2010] 
I’m admiring… Ally [she] is still too beautiful!!! [magua, 
08-04-2010] 
It has been so so so long since I last saw you [xiaoshu, 
08-04-2010] 
Flame wars are also frequent on Mitbbs. Standard topics for flame wars include 
“democracy in China,” “whether one should return to China,” “should one buy a Japanese 
car or American car,” and “should Chinese girls date Americans.” These can entice 
                                                            
10 A legendary bridge where couples meet. 
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threatening or abusive posts, which might result in users being banned or board masters 
impeached.  
Mitbbs posts are asynchronous, but because of the large user base, interaction can be 
quick. For example, little9’s post to the Soccer board obtained 143 replies within 3 
minutes when thousands of users gathered on the board during the 2010 World Cup. On 
the other hand, discussions about controversial topics can potentially last months.  
It should be noted that in Mitbbs, users can remove some posts and images, allowing an 
interaction pattern closer to synchronous systems.  For example, as mentioned, a typical 
post on the Fashion forum is a participant’s presenting herself in a favorite dress:  
Just had final(exam)today… I am so bored now I want to 
show my new dress. Is anyone interested in seeing? 
[eggpiggie] 
After receiving some replies expressing interest, the picture will be posted for minutes to 
hours and then deleted from the original post. A later reply was regretful: 
Oh, I missed it again! Can you show me one more time? 
[cocoLily]  
While Mitbbs has a number of unique interaction characteristics, those are not the 
central concern of this chapter.  We focus here on the use of weibi for social exchange.   
Table 16 lists some of the specific terms that are extensively used in Mitbbs discussions 






Table 16: Mitbbs Jargon 
Term Literal meaning Meaning on the forum 
weibi fake currency virtual money on Mitbbs 
baozi steamed stuffed bun a pack of 10 weibi11 
ben run quickly 1. post pictures of one’s self; 2. 
virtually present in public  
majia vest, shell alternative ID one might have to 
post with particular concern 
Mitbbs structure and coordination 
Similar to other Chinese webboards, Mitbbs is structured with more than 300 sub-forums 
(called boards). These boards are grouped into 12 large categories, such as “news,”  
“oversea life,” “sports,” and “alumni.” Each board is a space for people to post on a given 
topic. The centralized homepage provides links to highly ranked threads and boards.  
Each board is coordinated by volunteer administrators. There is one “board master” (BM) 
with several (1 to 5) “vice board masters” who are subordinate. These BMs mark or 
promote posts; edit (e.g., delete impropriate posts and archive old posts); reward, warn, 
or ban users; coordinate discussion; manage the board’s balance of virtual points; and, 
organize events (e.g., organize a special event with awards for posts). BMs themselves 
are organized through a board called the “Family of BMs,” where people can propose to 
initiate new boards, to be a BM, or to complain about a BM. A “station master” sysop can 
then make decisions based on this information.  
                                                            
11 Very interestingly, Yang (1994) observed villagers circulating real baozi in their gift-exchanging 
during the Chinese spring festival. In the old time or rural countryside in China, food such as baozi, 
eggs, wine, tea, and cigarettes were popular gifts among people, because they are commonly 




In addition, new or updated BBS policies are also posted, discussed, and modified 
through the thread format on boards. In fact, new policies have been invented, 
discussed, and institutionalized through the history of the BBS. For example, some users 
do not like their posts getting promoted onto web site’s front page (which may bring 
too much attention to the concerned parties in the post), thus there is a new policy that 
an author or BM can prevent this promotion from happening by adding a tag in the 
post’s title.  Sometimes the policies are local to a board. For example, on the Military 
forum, a frequent topic for a flame war is “Chinese girls dating Americans.” In July 2010, 
the Military BM posted the policy “whoever raises this topic again will be banned for 3 
days.” 
Mitbbs’ coordination system reflects a mixture of hierarchy and autonomy. In many ways, 
the administration is similar to any webboard: Users are moderated by BMs, there is a 
subordinate relationship between chief and vice-BMs, and stationmaster’s authority 
overrides any decisions.  In addition, users can voice their opinions on any issue, which 
can affect the administrators in that they need to satisfy users to the extent that they will 
return. On the other hand, there is a deference to central authority, or at least an 
acknowledgement of it, that is unusual on Western sites. 
Finally, a point system or virtual currency was introduced to incentivize participation. As 
we will demonstrate, points have been freely used in a variety of social interactions for 
diverse purposes and across contexts beyond their original intended use. We will 
describe the use of these virtual points following a brief description of the study. 
3. About the Study 
The author was a casual user of the Mitbbs site for over 4 years. Mitbbs forums have 
been a significant part of her life: providing political or entertainment news, offering 
experience and advice about problems with living in the US, as well as random surfing.  
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To further analyze Mitbbs behavior, we first read more than 2,400 threads from a period 
of 10 months. Some of these threads were translated by the author for subsequent 
analysis and to explain how the board was used to other co-authors. From the same time 
range, we selected more than 600 exemplars that were representative instances of 
Mitbbs social interactions around weibi. These threads were then translated, analyzed, 
and categorized in discussion with the other authors. We further scanned each board by 
querying for the keywords baozi and weibi in the thread titles, to obtain a basic sense of 
how participants use virtual points on each board. We identified a set of popular boards 
that extensively involved point exchanges, such as Ebiz (e-business), NextGeneration 
(child-rearing), and Fashion. These were compared to boards with few point interactions, 
such as Military, Returnee, and Family (which is mainly about controversial family issues, 
for example, “I fought with my father-in-law because he smoked indoor”).  
In addition, to gain the participants’ perspective about their interactions, we conducted 
1.5~2 hour interviews with 13 Mitbbs users. Nine interviewees were from the author’s 
personal social network, including friends of friends. Four additional volunteers were 
recruited via messages sent to forum participants. We also interviewed a board-master, 
who provided insider information on how the point mechanisms work. Most interviews 
were conducted through Google Talk, since using IM rather than other mechanisms 
allowed the interview subjects to release only a handle which could not be connected 
with their Mitbbs ID or real name. 
In this chapter, we have pseudo-anonymized all names and removed identifying detail. 
4. Points on Mitbbs 
Mitbbs launched its virtual point (weibi) system in 2006. The system was intended to 
reward contribution and administrative jobs. To mimic a real-world currency system, the 
site allows users to deposit (to get interest), transfer, and exchange these virtual points. 
Weibi are often exchanged as baozi, or units of 10 weibi. 
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Users can earn points through writing a post on one of the boards (0.1 weibi), having 
their post selected or promoted (10~100), posting pictures (10~20), gambling profits, 
and receiving them from other users.  
Points can be used in a number of ways. The primary uses of points are modifying 
avatars, gambling, giving to a board account, and social exchange. Each is covered in 
turn. 
Avatar fashion. About 10% of Mitbbs users who post display avatars next to their posts.  
These users must “clothe” their avatars on a regular basis, and this requires points. There 
are hundreds of items (e.g., jackets, purses, pets, facial expressions, hairstyles) available, 
priced from zero to 50 weibi. New items expire in 45 days after purchase, while second-
hand items will continue only for the remainder of the 45 days since the first purchase. If 
the user does not clothe his avatar, the avatar will be shown in underwear. One of our 
interviewees tells us that she needs weibi to buy some clothing, “when I want to post 
something, ... I don’t want to ben in underwear…. I need a fig leaf.  ... [The] cheapest or 
second-hand works” [I2]. 
The expiration was intended to encourage people to continue to earn and spend money 
for their avatar. The BBS also operates regular contests for best dressed avatars based on 
the votes from other users. However, as mentioned, only 10% posts are by users who 
have avatars in their profiles12. 
Gambling. Gambling can be a relatively fast way to earn or spend weibi. Gambling can 
be run by an individual, but mostly BMs run gambling as the banker in the name of a 
board. Gambling themes are diverse: people bet on stock values, soccer matches, birth 
dates of children, exchange rates for the RMB (Chinese currency), and even when the 
                                                            
12 People can change their display image from a picture to an avatar, or the reverse. For example, 
during the World Cup 2010, when users could buy their favorite team’s uniforms, we observed 
relatively more users using avatars. 
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Amazon.com website will crash. Gambling on stock values is often an on-going activity, 
while others like soccer scores are seasonal or event-driven.   
Board accounts. Each board maintains its own weibi balance. BMs reward users through 
board accounts for high quality posts or for participating in posting or presenting 
campaigns. Board accounts can also fund gambling. This will be discussed further below.  
Finally, users can give points away to other users. This is discussed at length next. 
5. Virtual Points in Use 
Weibi was intended originally to motivate contribution. However transferring points 
among individuals soon became the medium for a diverse set of social interactions, 
prevalent in many of the boards. 
Value of Weibi 
It is important to note that weibi is not officially convertible to real currency, and its real 
value is ambiguous at best. For example, one interviewee assigned a small monetary 
value to weibi. He recalled how he had used 100 weibi to buy a “15-off-75” Staples 
coupon (i.e., a coupon to save 15 $US on a 75 $US purchase), which he thought was a 
good deal: “You need real money to buy coupon on eBay…. Once I saw some people use 
US dollars to buy weibi at 150:1, which means I paid less than 1 dollar for that coupon” 
[I10] (Occasionally, users in need of weibi will post to a board asking to buy them from 
other users). Others do not perceive any monetary value for weibi. An interviewee who 
gave 1000 weibi to his friend for gambling, said, “Weibi is worth nothing [in real life]” 
[I12]. 
Instrumental Uses of Weibi 
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Rewarding and incentivizing others’ contributions is frequently observed on Mitbbs. 
Often, users post questions seeking serious and professional answers with a promise of 
weibi. For example, users have needed to know about house closing costs, formatting 
green card application letters, medical symptoms, lowest possible prices for computer 
equipment, or even how to find a Dell customer support “phone number for a living 
person.” Offering points in hopes of obtaining better answers is similar to the use of 
points in question-answer forums (Yang & Wei, 2009; Yang et al., 2010). 
People also use weibi to gather others’ attention. Baozi may be offered to people to 
promote a post onto more prominent positions (especially to the Mitbbs homepage). For 
example, one user offered baozi to those who would reply to her post about Jian-lian Yi, 
a Chinese star player in the NBA, in the hope of having it promoted to the front page. 
Another user showed his loyalty to a national soccer team by offering a baozi 
“reimbursement” to those users who would purchase Argentine uniforms for their 
avatars to support the team during the World Cup. Baozi has been used quite frequently 
in donation campaigns, e.g., two users offered 1 baozi to each of up to 50 users who 
would support (by replying) a post calling for donations for Qinghai (China) earthquake 
victims. Another user promised to give away all his baozi for votes in the “Chase 
Community Giving” campaign contest on Facebook.  
Less instrumentally, people also award others for a good post they encounter. For 
example, when one user enjoyed reading a post, she sent a baozi to the author and also 
posted the reply, “Hey, I really like your post, I will give you a baozi.” These “afterward” 
baozi gifts act to further social interaction and one’s guanxi network. One of our 
interviewees has posted several times on “how to apply makeup” with her photos 
demonstrating different techniques. She got a lot of compliments in the thread, but also, 
she received several messages with baozi attached. She said, “baozi is useless for me.  I 
share for fun… [but] I am happy to get these [messages]” [I13]. Another interviewee also 
received baozi with questions regarding his post about job seeking, “I replied in detail… 




Exchanging favors is often done between pairs of people who have good guanxi. Weibi 
can facilitate these kinds of exchanges among strangers on the BBS. Since users on the 
BBS share the common identity of Chinese students and very similar life experience (e.g., 
studied in the same schools or worked in the same places before and after coming to the 
US), the community formed a “small world network” in which people are closely 
connected with one another. Thus these strangers, although outside of one’s preexisting 
social (and guanxi) network, may be only a couple of degrees away and are very likely to 
develop new guanxi in the future in such a small-world community. These indirect guanxi 
links are very important in Chinese culture as indicating potential of new guanxi 
development (Hwang, 1987; Yang, 1994). Most of these exchanges will not be done 
without this kind of connection, and weibi serves as “indirect payment” when one seeks 
favors from outside of one’s preexisting networks (Yang, 1996). 
Illegal copies: One interviewee [I5] told us she spent hundreds of weibi to buy books in 
PDF format from other users on the site. For example, she bought an unlicensed copy of 
“Career Cup,” a book on answering technical interview questions, from another user for 
100 weibi (sold as a legal electronic copy for 29 $US online). This was a deal off the 
thread and board, but we could infer many such transactions from people’s relevant 
conversations. 
Review referral: A user posted a request on the Faculty board, asking for an opportunity 
to review journal or conference papers. One’s review record is crucial when applying for 
an EB-1 green card (for US permanent residency), and there is considerable discussion 
about this in relevant boards such as Immigration or Faculty (who are very likely to apply 
for this type of green card): 
Journal: 20 baozi 
Conference PC(Program Committee): 5 baozi 
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My research direction is data mining in computational 
biology. And later I switched to information retrieval on 
mobile devices. Send me BBS mail, and I will send you my 
vita.[happyLife] 
Similarly, horseJean asked for code that could be used to compute a “tight-binding 
model in NanoST”. Another user wanted a sample reference letter for faculty job 
applications, and she offered 5 baozi.   
On the Automobile board, baozi is frequently used for checking a car record with a given 
VIN number. Some people purchase the Autocheck or Carfax service when checking the 
record of a used car, and they usually can look up the records for more than one car. This 
favor is done for free as the person has already spent the money, and people started to 
use baozi in exchange for this help.  This has recently started to change, as people have 
begun to ask for money to do the checking.  
Collecting Renpin 
Collecting renpin (often “RP”) is a very common use of weibi on Mitbbs. Renpin in 
Chinese was originally used to describe one’s character or moral quality. Online, its 
meaning has shifted to more commonly connote something akin to “karma in present 
life”. Positive actions or deeds can accumulate renpin and result in later good luck.  
Renpin reflects a mixture of karma from Buddhism and the norm of reciprocity in 
people’s guanxi networks. However, renpin is a kind of karma that will pay out within 
one’s present life. In addition, Chinese people practice guanxi networking by cultivating 
mutual dependence and exchange of favors (Hwang, 1987; Yang, 1994), and people who 




Netizens have even derived a “Law of Conservation of Character13”: one needs to spend 
certain amount of renpin in order to get good luck in a particular situation, and if one 
gets bad luck that is because he has used up his renpin. It has been observed that renpin 
often drives people to “do good” in social interactions on the Internet in the absence of 
other social norms and religion. While some interviewees were skeptical of renpin, many 
more expressed sentiments like “I don’t exclude the possibility to collect RP by 
distributing baozi.” 
On Mitbbs, weibi plays an important role as the medium of collecting renpin. People 
distribute baozi to accumulate “blessings” from other users when they are hoping for a 
good outcome, for example, for a pregnancy, a parent’s visa interview, a spouse’s 
upcoming job interview, or a new romance. As another example, a user, oke, said in her 
post that: 
Baozi on the Baby board (NextGeneration) was really 
effective. I had a very smooth delivery of my baby, after 
I sent 66 baozi when it was 4 days overdue. 
Now I want to distribute 66 baozi again, asking for 
blessings on our 2-month overdue greencard approval. 
[oke,03-24-2010] 
Another user gave away “double-filling” (20 point) baozi in order to get rid of his “bad 
luck”: 
I bought baozi specifically for this. I was really unlucky 
in May, Lost a package around 3000 bucks Got a 800 bucks 
ticket and got my car back with another 200 bucks and got 
a very bad negative feedback14 and threw away my contact 
lens as trash. Everyone please give me some luck… 
[IamLegend,06-22-2010] 
This post obtained more than 150 replies although it only offered baozi to the first 20 
people who sent blessings. Many people replied with posts such as “really bad fortune-
                                                            
13 http://baike.baidu.com/view/1586.htm 
14 As a seller in eBay 
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loss,” “serious blessing,” and “endless good luck.” The posting also received numerous 
suggestions such as to wear “something fortunate” such as crystals. 
One of our interviewees described his experience of distributing baozi: “I requested 
blessings for my doctoral dissertation …It was a complicated situation, and I got [my 
thesis] signed by my committee on the last day …The process, anyway, was very tricky.” 
He sent baozi to each of the 100 users who replied, because “it would show my 
sincerity.” He believed he had collected RP for his thesis process: “Eventually I was 
surprisingly lucky… It passed and I believe the baozi worked” [I3]. 
Banquets of Baozi 
Banquets are one of the most prominent social instruments to sustain guanxi networks 
(Yang, 1994). On Mitbbs, people frequently hold “banquets of baozi” to celebrate various 
events. According to the “theory of renpin,” one needs to re-accumulate renpin as one 
“redeems” a portion as good luck. Thus people need to “do something good” by gifting 
back to the community to keep the “renpin balance.” Akin to food and drink given by 
hosts in real-life banquets or hongbao (a red small envelope containing cash) (Yang, 
1994), the baozi that is given on Mitbbs is considered a carrier of luck, thus rewarding 
the community.  
A few examples of banquets of baozi include a successful delivery of one’s baby, a 
successfully obtained visa, an approved green card application, an accepted offer on a 
house purchase, and getting job offers.  The success can be smaller as well: the 
successful sale of one’s used computer, finding a good deal on a purchase, or even 
celebrating Spain’s 2010 World Cup championship. 
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Baozi are not the only kind of gift item used for this. As we observed on the Job-hunting 
board, many users provide mianjing15 to reward the community. For example, one 
interviewee asked for blessings before her husband’s interview, and she urged him to 
post his mianjing onto the board as she promised.  
I did not have many points so I did not give. I felt an 
obligation to share mianjing …I think there are some 
people who blessed us because they want [mianjing]… it can 
somehow help people...It is returning the favor.[I2] 
Often, people give both baozi and useful information together as a reward to the 
community. For example, one user gave away baozi for receiving her Eb1a card (the 
highest priority greencard) and shared comprehensive information about her 
background. 
Gifting Weibi to Friends 
Weibi exchange is not limited to simply enhancing one’s guanxi online, but can be 
exchanged as a gift among friends to enhance both online and offline relationships. 
However, unlike other weibi uses on Mitbbs, weibi transfers among offline friends is often 
invisible. Despite this, we saw many cases where people indicate their transfers of weibi 
in discussion threads. For example, a user transferred 500 weibi to the eBiz board 
“sponsoring Xiongxiong to distribute [his/her] baozi.”  
Our interviewee who distributed 100 baozi for his dissertation also got many weibi from 
his offline friends: “I had accumulated a few by myself…and I know a couple of rich guys. 
I asked many from them, hah hah!” [I3]. Another interviewee said he had given 1000 
weibi to a friend from college, “baozi is worthwhile… 1k weibi can make [my friend] very, 
very happy, why not?” [I12]. 
                                                            
15 Literally translated as “scripture of interview,” this is where people write about the experience they 





Guanxi exists not only between two individuals, but also between an individual and the 
group. Correspondingly, weibi can also be utilized to reinforce relationships between an 
individual and a community (often within a board). For example, a user, yue, felt sad to 
see some users leave the Connecticut board, and offered them baozi to stay in touch: 
Several key people of our board – kekeLee, catFish, and 
yunQi are leaving! Sigh, I just got to know people here. I 
am moving too, but it is good that I will stay in 
Connecticut… 
I will give baozi to all tongxu16 who are moving, welcome 
whoever is coming and [say] farewell to whoever is 
leaving. …I wish all you happiness anywhere. …Those who 
are leaving please come back to chat when you get time, 
friendship is forever… 
There is a condition for eating [my] baozi: people moving 
out need to tell where they are going then I can find you 
later. People moving in also please tell me where you 
live, we can take care of each other. [yue, 07-21-2010] 
People often donate to a board they liked as the reward to its community. For example, 
appleSky donated 500 weibi to the eBiz board, and he/she said in the post: “I just 
donated 500 to eBiz, come on, let’s donate baozi, accumulate RP, and build our board 
together.” It is also quite common that people donate part of their weibi to the board 
account and ask the BM to help distribute the rest. A mutually beneficial interaction can 
be realized through this process: the donor can show kindness to the BM by offering 
points to both the board and people on the board, while the BM can help distribute 
weibi, bridging both the donor and other community members in guanxi.  
These community-rewarding activities often take place on boards where mutual help is 
appreciated and community is cherished. For example, on NextGeneration, people share 
knowledge and experience, and support one another going through the process of 
                                                            
16 Classmates or schoolmates, general names for young people who are likely in school. 
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becoming new parents, while on Pets, people not only share experiences of their loved 
pets, but often defend against outside pet-haters. By donating weibi, people show their 
appreciation and good wishes to a board and its community.  One user wrote “thanks to 
the Baby board” when donating weibi to the board. Another user, maya, wrote on his 
return to China:  
I have not figured out how to ‘cross the border 17 ’ onto 
Mitbbs, so I give away all my baozi I have…and, I want to 
give my best wish to the board, being still thriving and 
pure, in this superficial society. Farewell… [maya, 04-02-
2010] 
Another kind of individual-group interaction through weibi involves sponsorships for on-
board activities. For example, Soccer has an approximately 2 year old tradition of bidding 
for a board-logo sponsorship with a rate of 100 weibi per day. This allows fans to 
promote their beloved players or teams, as the winner will get his team logo on the 
right-hand side of the thread list. As well, one interviewee stated that people donate 
weibi as a form of registration fee or title sponsorship in food contests or online game 
competitions. 
6. Discussion 
Weibi is of token value, and the system has support for them – this has fostered their use 
as an important resource for the Mitbbs users. Indeed, weibi serves as a critical lubricant 
for a wide range of Chinese customs and norms. We have shown above how people on 
Mitbbs use weibi to serve a number of purposes they find valuable: The Mitbbs users, 
Chinese students and workers in the US, value guanxi, or their networks of reciprocal 
obligations, as would any person in China. Weibi can also serve to foster renpin, or karma 
conservation. It is hard to overstate the fit to Chinese culture that the uses of weibi have 
on Mitbbs. 
                                                            
17 Mitbbs.com is forbidden in mainland China, although people can gain access, for example, by using 
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Since weibi can circulate, social interactions are thus boosted through it (but probably 
resulting in less tension than with real money). Contributions on Mitbbs appear to be 
encouraged through the use of weibi, and positive social interactions also appear to be 
encouraged.  For example, users are willing to gift weibi to show their appreciation for a 
posting, and they post their pictures and valuable information. As well, users broadcast 
and celebrate their personal news through distributing weibi to other users, while 
obtaining plenty of admiration, praise, and blessings.   
Since the value of weibi is contextual and perceived differently by different people, it can 
thus be flexible and substitutable as an instrument in these reciprocal social exchanges.  
For example, one user had posted pictures of real baozi she made, to thank the board for 
helping her settle in Seattle and to introduce herself to the community. 
Karma Conservation 
Weibi in Mitbbs facilitates both the processes of collecting and returning renpin between 
individuals and the community, in order to maintain a “balanced karma.” During the 
interactions about renpin, weibi can act as the token of the social debt (Parry & Bloch, 
1989). In addition, due to its casual nature, it is easy to collect from and give to the 
crowd, thus it can enact the idea of karma circulating through the social system. Weibi, 
by fitting in as a resource in socially valued ways, can thereby add to a sense of 
generalized social obligation in a very Chinese culturally-specific manner. 
Visibility of Use 
The uses of weibi are visible, reflexively reinforcing users’ desires to create and maintain 
their guanxi networks through weibi. When seeing many people giving away weibi to 
celebrate, users come to understand that they should also do so. As well, they may be 
told do so, if they have something that could be celebrated or when they need blessings. 
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For example on Soccer during the World Cup, a user (Tevez) was asked to give away 
baozi, when the same-named soccer player scored a goal in an important match: 
tevez(should) give us baozi lah! [shanren2] 
In another case, mirror was asked to give away baozi for his good luck in shopping.  One 
replier posted mirror’s account info showing he is “rich” with 3800 weibi: 
Attention everybody, stand in line, mirror has 380 baozi 
[avatar10] 
Another reply stated simply: 
[one] has to give baozi for this [kind of good luck]. 
[Inception] 
Note that this reflects a social norm in Chinese culture that higher status people should 
contribute more to the community or to society, and in a guanxi network, weaker parties 
should be often favored in the relationship (Alston, 1989). 
Explicitness 
Bluntness in social interaction is often required online. Similarly, growing and utilizing 
one’s guanxi networks online by requesting favors and calling for action results in less 
subtlety than one might use offline. On the other hand, weibi is not money, and people 
are thus free to be less explicit in their requests.  
The degree to which people explicitly use weibi to exchange favor varies across people 
and boards. For example, one interviewee felt uncomfortable when seeing people ask for 
baozi when offering information or answering others’ questions in PennySaver, “I never 
saw this on other boards. It is a very happy thing to give away baozi in many other 
boards, to get blessing or celebrate,… I don’t go to PennySaver often so that might be 
why I am not used to it… I come from other boards where people just answer questions 




In this chapter, we discussed a thriving and devoted online community, Mitbbs. It is an 
online community where the users display behaviors typical of Chinese – the social uses 
of personal networks of reciprocal obligation called guanxi.   
Although Mitbbs is a single site, and any generalizations must necessarily be limited, 
social interactions on Mitbbs appear to be fostered by a small design feature. This design 
feature, however, is one that turned out to be critical for Mitbbs’ Chinese users -- a 
virtual currency.  This virtual currency, or weibi, has little real value.  Because its use is not 
structured, but is flexible, visible, ambiguously valued, and fits Chinese social practices, 
virtual currency is a valuable resource for Mitbbs users for a wide variety of their own 
purposes -- all in a very Chinese manner. 
As well, the virtual points are intensively used to practice and enhance a new social norm 
for the netizen generation: “karma conservation,” which evolves from mixing Buddhism 
and the guanxi networking philosophy. This norm acts not only as an additional basis for 
social reciprocity, but it is also a significant motivation for contribution in this online 
community. Weibi allows renpin to serve as an important mechanism for peer 






Conclusion and Future Work 
The previous four chapters used different methods to provide the first comprehensive 
and in-depth understanding of the dynamics of user behavior and system evolution, and 
how incentive and culture shape their complex dynamics. The four studies examined 
three types of information-sharing systems that vary in purpose, scale, and mechanism. 
But they present a variety of common characteristics that are important for 
understanding and designing other systems.  
The studies revealed the multifaceted characteristics of users’ behaviors in these 
information-sharing systems. Users’ behaviors are adaptive, diverse, and complex. First, 
incentive design—in addition to affecting individual transactions—can change users’ 
long-term behavior as users adapt to the system. Overall, users learned to get the most 
out of the system. For example, Taskcn participants discovered less-competitive and 
more-expensive tasks, and answerers in Baidu Knows learned how to improve answer 
quality and answering performance over time. On Mitbbs.com, users learned to use 
points by imitating others and inventing new ways to use points according to their 
specific need and context. These behavior patterns suggest that it is important to 
understand how users respond to incentive designs, what motivates them, and what the 
potential effects of users’ adaptive behaviors.  
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Individuals have adaptive trajectories over time, but so do the sites. Sites’ information 
and social dynamics evolve over time as well. For example, I observed that Q&A sites 
evolved over time in terms of the distribution of contributions and their ability to sustain 
users. In general, earlier adopters tend to be more committed to the site, which might 
indicate that they are more intrinsically motivated to use the site and that they have an 
advantage in accumulating reputation and experience. Often, the change in the 
composition of contributors responds to the changes in the overall survival rate of the 
users on a site. In Mitbbs.com, the variation and scope of the virtual currency usage  
expanded over time, and how the users perceive the value and meaning of the virtual 
currency has been evolving and diversifying too. All these findings suggest there are 
different stages of a site or a design (e.g., virtual currency in Mitbbs.com). Thus I might 
need to evaluate the status of a site or design by measuring multiple dimensions—
participation, composition of participation, and survival rate, for example.  In future work, 
I would like to investigate the evolution of a site’s dynamics for a longer time, and 
develop comprehensive metrics to identify the different life stages of a site. 
Users are diverse, and they vary on all kinds of dimensions: what motivates them, what 
strategies they use, and their expertise. On Taskcn, in particular, a large number of casual 
users contributed to its high traffic, while a small core of users provided the winning 
solutions, continually improving their performance. Casual users were less strategic, and 
thus tended to lose more, which made them less motivated than the core winning users. 
This suggests that in order to sustain the website, it is important to incentivize a core of 
users, as well as attract potential users to this core group from the high volume of 
attempters. In addition, it is also crucial to continue to drive large number of prospective 
members towards a site, to enhance a site’s publicity, sustain challenging competitions 
(for the task requesters), and bring new blood to the small, but highly active core of 
contributors. 
The second study demonstrated how Baidu Knows is composed of different user groups 
who differ in their motivation, contribution, participation, and strategies. For example, 
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the users can be grouped by their levels of contribution and expertise, but they also 
switched roles between asker and answerer. Between different roles they play, users were 
differently motivated and had different levels of commitment to the service. In Mitbbs, 
the usage and perception of the virtual currency weibi varied dramatically across topic-
boards too. The analytical method developed in these studies will be applied to 
examining more complex and diverse user behaviors in future work. In addition, I will 
develop systematic metrics to differentiate and evaluate each type of users and 
recommend schemes to motivate them respectively. 
Users’ behaviors can be very complex. The third study used Survival Analysis to quantify 
users’ participation lifespan, which reflects their commitment to a site and the site’s 
ability to sustain users over time. Consistently across sites, users who prefer answering 
tended to stay longer and were less sensitive to their initial experience. In addition, users’ 
first-month experience accounted for a considerable amount of variance in predicting 
lifespan. In particular, users’ self-selection effect (e.g., whether a user is active or what 
type of role one likes to play) and performance in the community accounted for most of 
the variance in their behavior. This suggests that intrinsic motivation (e.g., whether a user 
enjoys answering questions) is the key factor behind bringing in and sustaining users; 
however, sites can still motivate users by improving their asking and answering 
experiences. For example, sites can direct users to the questions that might be 
interesting and proper for them to answer. Similarly in Mitbbs.com, when the virtual 
currency weibi evolved to be a blended medium of social support and exchange, as well 
as good luck and karma, it blurred the boundary between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation, encouraging more intensive social interactions.  
Culture comes into the picture and makes users’ behavior even more complex. For 
instance, Taskcn’s success at getting so many might partially result from China’s large 
surplus of human labor. The third study provided the first large-scale comparison study 
among the three countries’ popular Q&A. Although the three sites have similar incentive 
schemes, system designs, and scales, they present significant differences: users of 
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Yahoo!Answers tended to stay longer on the site, and the answerers tended to be more 
active in providing answers than the users of the two other sites. By analyzing the 
contents of sample questions and answers, we found that the question-answering 
dynamics on Yahoo!Answers tended to be more conversational than Baidu Knows. This 
difference might be explained by a complex interaction between the small discrepancy of 
the incentive designs and culture of the participants. This interaction changes both what 
people ask and how people answer. Therefore, in order to evaluate how efficiently the 
sites exchange information and social supports, it will be necessary to conduct field 
experiments across sites in future work. 
The fourth study is a deeper investigation into how incentive design and culture can 
interact and co-evolve in a very complex way in a Chinese information-sharing system. 
Weibi, the virtual currency used on Mitbbs, was designed to motivate contribution not 
unlike ones employed by many US-based websites. However, the ambiguity of its value 
ended up perfectly supporting the crucial social dynamics of Chinese communities — 
guanxi, which requires fluid networking, calculated reciprocity, and contextual renqing 
interactions. In addition, users helped weibi evolve to incorporate the norms of a new 
generation of Internet users: renpin, or karma. This created many new purposes and uses 
of weibi, boosting the social interactions and contributions in the community. 
Furthermore, people attached new meanings to weibi, such as kindness, blessing, and 
good luck. Thus weibi can motivate users both extrinsically and intrinsically. 
Mitbbs.com provided a specific instance of how incentive design can interact with a 
particular community structure and culture in complex ways, and how the interaction can 
lead to a co-evolutionary process between the design and the way users perceive and 
use the incentive design. This suggests that sites will face stiff challenges when they 
cross cultures. There are two areas I would like to pursue in future work: 1) I would like to 
explore what cultural considerations have been taken when designing information-
sharing systems in different cultures. For example, how and why did Yahoo!Answers and 
Baidu Knows design different incentive schemes? How and why did Twitter and Sina 
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Weibo (a Chinese micro-blogging service) develop different designs? (2) I would like to 
identify which dimensions are particularly influenced by culture and how to design 
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